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LYING, STEALING, AND CHEATING:
THE ROLE OF ARBITRATORS AS ETHICS ENFORCERS
Kristen M. Blankley*
I. INTRODUCTION
Q: How can you tell if an attorney is about to lie? A: His lips move.
Upon seeing an elderly lady for the drafting of her will, the attorney
charged her $100. She gave him a $100 bill, not noticing that it was stuck
to another $100 bill. On seeing the two bills stuck together, the ethical
question came to the attorney's mind: “Do I tell my partner?”
Q: The tooth fairy, an honest lawyer, and an expensive, dishonest
lawyer are in the same room. There is a $500 bill on a table in the room.
When they leave, the money is gone. Who took it? A: Since there is no
such thing as the tooth fairy or an honest lawyer, the answer is obvious.
The National Institutes of Health have announced that they will no
longer be using rats for medical experimentation. In their place, they will
use attorneys. They have given three reasons for this decision: (1) There
are now more attorneys than there are rats. (2) The medical researchers
don't become as emotionally attached to the attorneys as they did to the rats.
(3) No matter how hard you try, there are some things that rats won't do.1
“Jokes” such as these regarding lawyers are commonplace and easy to
find. A quick search of the internet will uncover dozens of websites with
hundreds of lawyer jokes.2 Although lawyers are not the only professionals
subject to such joking, the public perception of lawyers as willing to lie,

* Assistant Professor, University of Nebraska College of Law. Many thanks to the people who
helped throughout the editing and drafting process, including Steve Wilborn, Richard Moberly, Maureen
Weston, Sarah Cole, and Ariana Levinson. Thank you to the University of Louisville Brandeis School
of Law for allowing me to present an early version of this paper at the annual Warns Arbitration
Conference. Many thanks to my research assistants, Justin Yates and Nick Holle, for their assistance.
Thanks and love to Michael Douglass, Jr.
1
These lawyer “jokes” were all taken from the following website: 185 LAWYER JOKES,
http://www.stromer.com/jokes/185jokes.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
2
See, e.g., Douglas Adams, Lawyer Jokes: A Collection, http://people.ku.edu/~dadams/lawyers.htm (last
updated Nov. 26, 2001); Peter Tiersma, Lawyer Jokes: Truth and Nonsense About the Legal Profession,
LANGUAGEANDLAW.ORG, http://www.languageandlaw.org/JOKES.HTM (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
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cheat, steal, and live beyond ethical boundaries is troubling and damaging
to the profession.3 But as they say, all jokes are based on a kernel of truth.
All joking aside, the availability of an honest, reputable, and impartial
tribunal for dispute resolution is essential to build public confidence and
trust. Today’s American legal system, for the most part, carries the
imprimatur of justice and bestows a relative level of confidence on those
who seek to resolve disputes in a lawful manner.4 Without such confidence,
a system of revenge and vigilante justice would likely have become the
norm.
The American justice system has certain hallmarks that help foster this
sense of justice and give ease to participants that their disputes will be
handled in a fair manner. Judges are respected individuals who are either
appointed or elected who serve outside of the political system. 5 Courts and
court filings are public and open to the press, which helps ensure the
transparency of the process.6 Juries of peers must engage in group
decision-making to arrive at a consensus or supermajority in order to issue a
verdict in a case.7 Lawyers must certify that they are acting ethically when
filing court documents,8 and judges have the ability to sanction lawyers,
parties, and witnesses for engaging in wrongdoing.9 In addition, judges are
required to abide by certain ethical codes10 and their reasoned opinions (for
the most part) clearly show the judges’ reasoning in those situations.
The arbitral forum, in contrast, does not command the same type of
public trust as the formal court system. Many types of arbitration are
conducted outside of the public eye in either confidential proceedings or
simply nonpublic proceedings.11 Naysayers often describe arbitration as

3
See Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public Opinion, Jokes, and Political
Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805, 806–07 (1998).
4
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2012).
5
See generally Peter Paul Olszewski, Sr., Who's Judging Whom? Why Popular Elections are Preferable to
Merit Selection Systems, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 4 (2004). Although many state level judges are elected, and
the states have differing laws regarding whether those judges may campaign using reference to their political
parties, once these people become judges, they are expected to serve outside and “above” the political system.
6
See generally Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) (discussing the shared right
between the public and the accused to a public trial).
7
See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 411 (1972).
8
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
9
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
10
See generally MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2010).
11
See Stefano Azzali, Confidentiality vs. Transparency in Commercial Arbitration: A False Contradiction
to Overcome, CTR. FOR TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION, ARBITRATION AND COMMERCIAL LAW (Dec. 28, 2012),
http://blogs.law.nyu.edu/transnational/2012/12/confidentiality-vs-transparency-in-commercial-arbitration-afalse/. Many arbitrations are confidential because the parties agreed to hold the proceedings in confidence. For
some types of cases, such as labor cases, reporters of arbitral awards exist. For many other types of cases, such as
consumer cases and business cases, no such reporters exist, and it becomes difficult to locate arbitration awards.

2014]

Lying, Stealing, and Cheating

445

“secret,” and imply that rampant bias and other horribles occur behind the
closed doors of the arbitration tribunals.12 Arbitration has not been immune
from criticism, particularly from scholars,13 public advocacy groups,14 and
legislators,15 among others.16 Although this author has largely been a
supporter of the arbitration process,17 I have only supported the process
when that process is fair and conducted in an ethical manner.
Previously, I have written articles on arbitration ethics, uncovering that
the arbitration process is not only unregulated but also free from any state
oversight.18 The ethical landscape for arbitration becomes even more
troublesome given the rise in the application of judicial immunity for all
participants in the arbitral forum, including attorneys, parties, and
witnesses.19 I previously argued that certain legal changes should be
implemented in order to allow for greater oversight of the arbitral forum to
police unethical behavior.20 These changes included extending criminal

12
See, e.g., Zachary Gima et al., Forced Arbitration: Unfair and Everywhere, PUB. CITIZEN 2 (Sept. 14,
2009), http://www.citizen.org/documents/UnfairAndEverywhere.pdf (describing arbitration as “secret” and
unfair, particularly to consumers).
13
See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247, 1249
(2009); David Sherwyn, Because it Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute Voluntary Arbitration Programs Will Fail to
Fix the Problems Associated with Employment Discrimination Law Adjudication, 1 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 1, 3 (2003); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Keeping Arbitrations from Becoming Kangaroo Courts, 8 NEV. L.J. 251, 254
(2007); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1632 (2005).
14
See Stempel, supra note 13, at 254–55.
15
See, e.g., Henry C. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration Act’s Interstate Commerce Requirement:
What’s Left for State Arbitration Law?, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 385, 401 (1992) (stating that many states
have precluded enforcement of arbitration agreements in certain contracts).
16
See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 13, at 1633 (noting the criticism of arbitration by journalists).
17
See, e.g., Kristen M. Blankley, Keeping a Secret from Yourself? Confidentiality When the Same
Neutral Serves Both as Mediator and as Arbitrator in the Same Case, 63 BAYLOR L. REV. 317, 333
(2011) (explaining that parties who employ the same individual as a mediator and arbitrator may be less
candid during mediation for fear of confidentiality breaches); Kristen M. Blankley, Did the Arbitrator
“Sneeze”?—Do Federal Courts Have Jurisdiction over “Interlocutory” Awards in Class Action
Arbitrations?, 34 VT. L. REV. 493, 494 (2010) (arguing for judges to not issue interlocutory appeals when
dealing with arbitrations); Kristen M. Blankley, Class Actions Behind Closed Doors? How Consumer
Claims Can (and Should) be Resolved by Class-Action Arbitration, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 451,
453 (2005) (arguing that arbitrators should hear class action claims); Sarah R. Cole & Kristen M.
Blankley, Empirical Research on Consumer Arbitration: What the Data Reveals, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV.
1051, 1079 (2009) (finding empirical evidence that arbitration benefits consumers).
18
Kristen M. Blankley, Taming the Wild West of Arbitration Ethics, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 925, 932
(2012) (noting that ethical misconduct in arbitral forums becomes increasingly possible without criminal
sanctions) [hereinafter Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I].
19
Kristen M. Blankley, Advancements in Arbitral Immunity and Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards Create
Ethical Loopholes in Arbitration (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 2) [hereinafter Blankley, Arbitration Ethics
II], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2239182.
20
Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 929; Blankley, Arbitration Ethics II, supra note 19
(manuscript at 3).
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laws regarding the administration of justice to the arbitral forum21 and
conforming the standard of review for participant fraud to the same
standard as every other grounds for review under the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA).22
Although I still support advocating for these systematic changes at the
legislative and judicial level, my previous research only scratched the
surface for another type of ethics enforcement in the arbitral forum—the
arbitrators themselves. While not explicit in my previous research,
arbitrators can and should be the first line of defense in dealing with
participant misconduct.23 In fact, arbitrators are already equipped with the
tools for enforcing their own tribunals, both by their inherent powers as
well as by rules of provider organizations.24 My previous writings
mistakenly presumed that arbitrators have and should execute these powers
to ensure a fair tribunal.25 To date, however, no scholarship has examined
the arbitrator’s ability to regulate and police the conduct of participants,
especially to correct for ethical shortcomings. This Article seeks to fill this
void in the scholarship.
Placing greater emphasis on the arbitrator’s role as ethics enforcer
comports with our deeply held notions of due process and fundamental
fairness—both of which are judicially required of the arbitral tribunal.26 As

21
Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 948 (“[E]very state should update its law to
include arbitration within the ambit of these criminal laws.”).
22
Blankley, Arbitration Ethics II, supra note 19 (manuscript at 3) (noting that currently, the standard
for vacatur for “fraud” is unreasonably higher than the standard for vacatur under any other grounds for
review).
23
See Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 926; Blankley, Arbitration Ethics II, supra note 19
(manuscript at 2).
24
See, e.g., INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE RULES OF ARBITRATION (2012), available at
http://www.iccwbo.org/Products-and-Services/Arbitration-and-ADR/Arbitration/ICC-Rules-of-Arbitration/.
25
See, e.g., Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 974–75.
26
See, e.g., Tempo Shane Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that an
arbitral award is subject to vacatur in cases in which the arbitral procedure did not comport with
fundamental fairness); Star Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, No. 13-13807, 2013
WL 5182745, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 12, 2013) (finding that fundamental fairness was not present in an
arbitral process in which ex parte communications with arbitrators was happening); Wolf v. Sprenger +
Lang, P.L.L.C., 70 A.3d 225, 237 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“Misconduct under section 10(a)(3) of the FAA
usually involves the exclusion of pertinent and material evidence that deprives a party of fundamental
fairness.”); Senra v. Town of Smithfield, 715 F.3d 34, 38–40 (1st Cir. 2013) (discussing the due process
rights for an employee in a post-termination arbitration). In addition, some arbitral providers have their
own “Due Process Protocols” to govern the proceedings. The American Arbitration Association, for
example, has at least three Due Process Protocols for consumer cases, employment cases, and healthcare
cases. See generally AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (2012), available
at www.adr.org; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (2011), available at
www.adr.org; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, HEALTHCARE DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (2011), available at
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the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, the arbitral forum is not a waiver
of substantive rights, but merely a change in the forum determining whether
those rights have been violated.27 If the arbitral forum is intended to be a
substitute for the judicial forum, then it must be fair and free from
misconduct. Given the lack of institutional controls over the arbitral forum,
arbitrators appear to be the first and last resort to protect participants and
ensure a fair forum. The arbitrator as “ethics enforcer” may be a new and
uncomfortable role, especially considering that arbitrators are hired by the
parties and may stand to earn a significant amount of money in present and
future assignments from the parties. Despite the potential (and perhaps
implicit) conflict, due process and fundamental fairness require arbitrators
to stand above the parties, respond to parties’ concerns, and be vigilant to
raise concerns sua sponte. Anything less would jeopardize the integrity of
arbitration and further erode public confidence in the process.
This Article will begin in Part II with a short description of the
expansion of judicial immunity, which is one of the biggest motivating
reasons for concern for arbitral ethics. If judicial immunity were not
extended to the arbitral forum, parties who fall victim to unethical practices
in the arbitral forum might have recourse. Immunity for arbitration
participants, then, creates a pressing need for other reform. Reform, as
noted in Part III, could be achieved through changes to the law—
particularly by expanding the criminal laws dealing with crimes against the
administration of justice to the arbitral forum or ever so slightly loosening
the standards of vacatur in the event of unethical conduct, or both.
Recognizing that these legal reforms are unlikely, Part IV of this Article
examines the arbitrator’s role as the ethics enforcer. Part V will consider
the historical role of arbitrators in policing the conduct within their
tribunals, as well as examine the rules and procedures of the largest
arbitration provider organizations. Arbitrators, indeed, should be the first
line of defense in dealing with allegations of unethical conduct—as well as
being vigilant themselves during their tribunal. Realistically speaking,
arbitrators are the only true ethics enforcers in the arbitral forum, a role that
they rightly deserve. Without arbitrators taking on this role, the integrity of
the arbitration process will be in jeopardy. This Article concludes by
acknowledging the role of arbitrator as ethics enforcer while still urging for
legal change as an ethics “backstop.”

www.adr.org.
27
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (dealing with claims under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (dealing
with claims under the Securities Exchange Act).

448

UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:443

II. HOW ARBITRAL IMMUNITY CHANGES THE ETHICS LANDSCAPE
Talking about arbitral immunity at the beginning of the discussion feels
almost counterintuitive because it feels as if the discussion is starting at the
end. After all, arbitral immunity is a concept that generally figures into a
post-arbitration discussion, as opposed to a discussion about unethical
conduct occurring during an arbitration. The application of the immunity
doctrine, however, to arbitration has dramatically changed the ethical
landscape of the arbitral forum in unexpected ways. Although the
extension of the immunity doctrine, described more fully below, rightfully
should be extended to the arbitral forum, the immunity doctrine frustrates
any effort to enforce ethical violations made by arbitration participants. If
the process cannot be managed in an ethical manner, then arbitration runs
the risk of being a forum lacking due process controls.
Essentially, the concept of absolute,28 sometimes called “judicial,”
immunity shields judicial participants (judges, lawyers, witnesses, parties,
etc.) from later suit based on comments made and actions taken in the
judicial forum.29 The classic application of absolute immunity applies to a
suit for defamation based on statements made during a judicial
proceeding.30 This “classic” definition of absolute immunity has been
extended to any number of other tort claims “sounding” in defamation,31

28

Note that the concept of absolute immunity also applies in the legislative and other governmental
forums. See 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 500 (2010); 56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal Corporations,
Etc. § 133 (2010); Charles W. Johnson IV, The Doctrine of Official Immunity: An Unnecessary
Intrusion into Speech or Debate Clause Jurisprudence, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 535, 535 (1994); Jeanine
M. Pollitt, Legislative Immunity and City Councils: Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625 (1990), 13
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1049, 1050 (1990).
29
See, e.g., Kidd v. Superior Nursing Care, Inc., No. 08-504 (JAP), 2008 WL 2945960, at *2 (D.N.J.
July 28, 2008) (“A statement made in the course of judicial, administrative, or legislative proceedings is
absolutely privileged and wholly immune from liability.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Schultea v. City of Patton Vill., H-06-0666, 2006 WL 3063457, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2006)
(“Statements made in the due course of a quasi-judicial proceeding cannot serve as the basis of a civil
action for defamation regardless of the negligence or malice with which they were made.”) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
30
See, e.g., Kidd, 2008 WL 2945960, at *2.
31
Mahoney & Hagberg v. Newgard, 712 N.W.2d 215, 219 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (“Even if the
claim is not for defamation, if it sounds in defamation, absolute immunity applies. The judicial
immunity rule is not to be ‘scuttled’ by pleadings which allege that the wrongful acts resulted from a
conspiracy rather than from defamation.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Mahoney & Hagberg court noted that, most often, the defense of absolute immunity arises in the context
of a defamation claim. Id. (“Respondent claims that judicial immunity applies only to defamation
claims. Traditionally, judicial immunity has applied to protect participants in the judicial process
against claims of defamation. [D]efamatory matter published in the due course of a judicial proceeding
is absolutely privileged and will not support a civil action for defamation[.] In Minnesota, nearly all
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such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, unfair competition,
conspiracy, and other similar torts.32 Living up to the title of “absolute,”
this immunity applies regardless of the speaker’s intent33 and whether the
statement is written or oral.34 Generally, the only limitations on the
privilege are (1) that the statement occurs within a protected proceeding
(such as a court or legislative proceeding), and (2) that the statement is
pertinent to the claims brought or relief sought.35
Perhaps unsurprisingly, absolute immunity has been applied to the
arbitral forum. In many ways, the arbitral forum is similar to the litigation
forum, with both proceedings involving a neutral, third-party decisionmaker making a binding decision after a presentation of evidence.36 The
few cases dealing directly with this issue have all decided to extend
immunity to arbitration. Although the cases are factually different, the
courts rely on similar reasoning for this application of the law to this new
territory.37 These courts rightly extend the doctrine of immunity to
arbitration for the following reasons (again, with the caveat that institutional
controls can ensure that arbitration is a fundamentally fair forum):

assertions of judicial immunity involve underlying claims for defamation.”) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 114, at
816–17 (5th ed. 1984)).
32
See Asset Mgmts. Sys., Inc. v. White, Zuckerman, Warsavsky & Luna, No. B143168, 2002 WL
724925, at *8–9 (Cal. Ct. App. April 25, 2002) (dismissing all of the causes of action on the basis of
immunity, including the causes of action for abuse of process and unfair business practice).
33
Soliz v. Williams, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 192 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (“However, the immunity from a suit
for damages at issue is not dependent on the severity of the misconduct.”).
34
Gallegos v. Escalon, 993 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (“All communications, oral or
written, made in the due course of a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged.”).
35
Harmon v. Bennett, 103 Wash. App. 1045 (2000) (“Allegedly libelous statements, spoken or
written by a party or counsel in the course of a judicial proceeding, are absolutely privileged if they are
pertinent or material to the redress or relief sought, whether or not the statements are legally sufficient to
obtain that relief.”) (citing McNeal v. Allen, 621 P.2d 1285 (Wash. 1980)). Off-hand comments not
fitting this definition are not protected. See Post v. Mendel, 507 A.2d 351, 356 (Pa. 1986) (holding that
a letter sent by an attorney was not privileged because it was not relevant to the redress or relief sought
by the client).
36
Stephen J. Ware, Similarities Between Arbitration and Bankruptcy Litigation, 11 NEV. L.J. 436, 446–47
(2011).
37
Kidwell v. General Motors Corp., 975 So. 2d 503, 504 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (“[W]e agree
with the trial court that Nichols had immunity for his alleged wrongful actions because they occurred
during an arbitration proceeding.”) (involving a dispute over a purchased pickup truck); Bushell v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 683 N.E.2d 1286, 1289 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (involving an employment grievance);
Odyniec v. Schneider, 588 A.2d 786, 793 (Md. 1991) (involving a claim against an expert witness for
statements made in a medical malpractice arbitration).
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A. Promotion of Candor Within the Tribunal
Perhaps the single most important reason for the doctrine of immunity
is the policy of promoting candor within the tribunal. In litigation and
arbitration alike, the third-party neutral must make decisions based on
evidence presented before the tribunal.38 Decision-makers must sort
through conflicting evidence in order to determine the truth of what
happened in the past. The immunity doctrine aids these decision-makers in
finding the truth by encouraging people to come forth to the tribunal with
their evidence.39 The ability to encourage parties to speak certainly also
promotes fundamental fairness, especially considering that promoting
candor helps promote relevant, truthful statements.
A dispute resolution forum without immunity from suit for statements
made within it would chill speech. People would be less willing to come
forth with their evidence if they potentially faced civil repercussion initiated
by the other side, simply for appearing in court and giving testimony.40 The
rule, while protecting a certain amount of civil harm done to individuals
within the fora, encourages speech and helps promote the truth-seeking
function of the tribunal.41 For those claims pursued in the public forums
(such as court), the criminal laws regarding perjury, tampering, and
obstruction of justice serve as a valuable backstop to deter wrongdoing and
prosecute those who engage in criminal conduct injurious to the process.42

38

See 1 JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 8:41 (3d ed. 2012). Unlike judges,
arbitrators are strictly bound by the evidence brought before them. See id. Arbitrators who conduct their own
research outside of the parties’ presentations may have their awards subject to vacatur. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3)
(2012) (stating that arbitration awards may be vacated for any misbehavior causing prejudice to any party’s
rights); 1 GRENIG, supra, at § 8:41 (“An arbitrator cannot take any evidence outside of the hearing without the
parties’ authorization. It is improper for arbitrators independently to inspect property or to investigate matters
involved in a dispute unless all of the parties are fully aware of the investigation and agree to it, or unless the rules
under which the arbitration is being conducted permit it.”).
39
See, e.g., Blevins v. Hudson & Keyse, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 2d 662, 666 (S.D. Ohio 2004)
(“[W]itness immunity fosters the truth-finding judicial function within the context of the adversarial
process.”); Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hosp., 865 A.2d 1163, 1171 (Conn. 2005) (“Put simply,
absolute immunity furthers the public policy of encouraging participation and candor in judicial and
quasi-judicial proceedings.”).
40
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895D cmt. b (1977).
41
See cases cited supra note 39.
42
See Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18 at 928–29.
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B. Encouraging Parties to Seek Redress
Applying the judicial privilege also allows parties, particularly
plaintiffs, to initiate an action without the fear of being sued later for
bringing that action.43 For the judicial system to work, parties must have
trust in the system, or at least enough trust in the system to not resort to
vigilante justice.44 Bestowing judicial privilege on participants gives them
the security and protection that they need to resort to the usual channels of
justice for dispute resolution.45 Judicial privilege also protects those who
have questionable claims to allow them to bring them up for resolution
without fear of future lawsuits based on the bringing of the claim.46
Advocates, too, are protected by the judicial privilege, giving them
flexibility in their lawyering styles.47
Without the privilege, disputants would be less likely to seek redress in
the proper channels and more likely to resort to self-help or vigilante
justice. Providing a forum for the orderly resolution of disputes is a

43

See, e.g., Harvey v. Montgomery Cty., Tex., No. 11-CV-1815, 2012 WL 12530, at *6 (S.D. Tex.
Jan. 3, 2012) (“Policy interests justifying immunity include the fact that the fear of suit may cause the
prosecutor to ‘shade his decisions instead of exercising the independence of judgment required by his
public trust.’”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); Ims v. Town of Portsmouth, 32
A.3d 914, 928 (R.I. 2011) (“The doctrine of absolute privilege exists because it is more important that
witnesses be free from the fear of civil liability for what they say than that a person who has been
defamed by their testimony have a remedy.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
44
See, e.g., Gregory P. Magarian, Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First Amendment
Destabilizes the Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 49, 87 (2012) (noting that in today’s modern system, we have
a police force that will keep law and order and eliminate the need for vigilante justice); C. Crystal
Enekwa, Comment, Capital Punishment and the Marshall Hypothesis: Reforming a Broken System of
Punishment, 80 TENN. L. REV. 411, 445 (2013) (describing one rationale for the death penalty is to serve
a retributive ends and keep people from resorting to vigilante justice).
45
See Ims, 32 A.3d at 928.
46
See Lambert v. Carneghi, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 626, 644 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). Of course, some civil
penalties may result from certain abuses of the litigation process: Attorneys who violate Rule 11, for
example, may be subject to sanctions, see FED. R. CIV. P. 11, and parties who engage in certain abuses
could be liable for the tort of abuse of process, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 (1977), or
violate a statute prohibiting frivolous conduct, see, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West 2013)
(granting trial courts discretion to order party or attorney responsible for frivolous actions or delays to
pay expenses); N.H. R. SUPER. CT. R. 59 (granting court authority to assess costs and fees against party
responsible for frivolous or unreasonable conduct).
47
Ronald S. Canter & Manuel H. Newburger, Common Law Immunity for Litigation Activities
Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 29, 39 (2007) (discussing
the importance of attorneys exercising sound legal perspective as part of their duty as officers of the
court and needing immunity from attempting to help clients achieve representation for their colorable
legal claims); Monica R. Nuckolls, Torts, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 439, 465 (2008) (noting that absolute
privilege exists “to promote the public policy ‘of securing to attorneys as officers of the court the
upmost freedom in their efforts to secure justice for their clients’”) (citation omitted).
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laudable goal underlying our entire legal system, including the system of
arbitration. Again, the privilege would protect a certain amount of
wrongful, hurtful, and damaging conduct, but the protections offered by the
privilege far outweigh the potential harm. Provided that the criminal law is
available to serve as both a deterrent and a backstop for wrongful conduct,
the privilege serves the important policy of encouraging dispute resolution
in proper channels.
C. Preventing Endless Satellite Litigation
If judicial privilege did not exist, then one lawsuit could generate
multiple lawsuits sounding in defamation just based on the claims in the
original lawsuit alone. Without judicial privilege, the winning party in a
lawsuit could file a new suit against the losing party for making the
allegedly “false” statements during the prior lawsuit.48 Unchecked, this
type of litigation would spin on into infinity, potentially resulting in
inconsistent findings, offsetting obligations, and other complications over
the course of generations. Immunity, therefore, helps relieve the courts
from a burgeoning docket and protects the finality of judgments.49
These three policy reasons for immunity—promoting testimony,
encouraging the redress of wrongs, and preventing satellite litigation—all
apply equally to arbitration. Arbitrators need to hear evidence and
determine the truth of the past.50 Participants, including representatives,
should be free to present evidence without civil liability, and the awards of
arbitrators should be considered final.51
Of course, one could argue that given the nonpublic nature of
arbitration, the harm caused by actions otherwise amounting to
“defamation” would arguably be less. In a public proceeding, the harm
caused by the statements made in the forum could have wide-reaching and
very public effects. If the harm is less, then, immunity would not be

48
Surace v. Wulinger, 495 N.E.2d 939, 944 (Ohio 1986) (noting that without privilege, court dockets
would be burdened by lawsuits based upon statements made in other proceedings).
49
Id.; see also Lambert, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 644 (noting that privilege serves to “promote finality of
judgments by discouraging endless collateral litigation.”). Perhaps contract law could protect arbitral
participants from engaging in this type of behavior if the parties were to agree that the arbitrator’s
decision would be final, binding, and not subject to any type of review or other lawsuit. Whether this
type of agreement would be valid, however, is questionable, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008), which put limitations on
the parties’ ability to expand judicial review.
50
See Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 929.
51
See discussion supra Part II.A–C; discussion infra Part II.D.
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needed. Immunity however, does not serve to curb the harm of an alleged
defamatory statement. Immunity is counterintuitive—it allows some types
of bad behavior in order to best preserve other important virtues. These
virtues are similarly important in arbitration, whether the magnitude of the
harm is the same. Some additional policies underlying the privilege
particularly serve the arbitral forum. These next sections discuss those
interests.
D. Finality in Arbitration
One of the primary reasons that parties choose arbitration is to have a
dispute resolution process that ensures a final and binding decision.
Finality is achieved primarily through the limited review provided to parties
in the FAA.52 Under the FAA, an arbitration award can only be overturned
in the most limited of circumstances, including (1) “corruption, fraud, or
undue means,” (2) “evident partiality” of the neutral, (3) arbitrator
procedural “misconduct,” or (4) arbitrators “exceed[ing] their powers.”53
Congress established this limited review to ensure finality of awards. 54
These grounds are extraordinarily difficult to meet, and a small number of
awards are overturned by the courts on an annual basis.55
Given the fact that finality is already an important virtue in arbitration,56
extending absolute immunity to the arbitral context makes perfect sense.
Immunity serves to protect the finality of judgments.57 Finality is a key
tenet of arbitration,58 so extending judicial immunity to the arbitral forum
fulfills these important policy objectives.59
E. Decision-Making on a Limited Record
To promote arbitration’s efficiencies in terms of time and money, many
participants rightfully truncate prehearing discovery when they participate
in arbitration. Although traditional discovery, including depositions and

52

See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012).
Id.
See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008).
55
See Julia A. Martin, Note, Arbitrating in the Alps Rather Than Litigating in Los Angeles: The
Advantages of International Intellectual Property-Specific Alternative Dispute Resolution, 49 STAN. L. REV. 917,
947 n.237 (1997) (noting, at the time, that less than 10% of arbitral awards are overturned each year).
56
Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 931.
57
Lambert v. Carneghi, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 626, 644 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
58
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
59
See discussion supra Part II.A–D.
53
54
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document requests, often occurs prior to an arbitral hearing, often, the
parties engage in less formal discovery to adhere to tighter hearing
deadlines.60 By limiting discovery in this manner, parties have the potential
to save considerable time and money compared to traditional litigation.61
If, however, the parties only engage in limited discovery prior to the
hearing, the parties go into the hearing with a less developed record and a
greater potential for “surprises.”62 Given the limited record, the arbitrator’s
assessment of credibility becomes even more important than in civil
litigation. Unlike civil litigation, the parties may not have prior deposition
testimony or other evidence to demonstrate inconsistent statements.63 The
arbitrator, then, might rely more heavily on demeanor and body language to
determine the credibility of the witnesses. Given the greater truthdetermining function of the neutral in arbitration, absolute immunity, then,
encourages parties to put forth evidence and other testimony without fear of
reprisal, allowing the arbitrators to do their job.
F. Summary Conclusion
The expansion of immunity to the arbitral forum not only promotes the
original policy goals for the privilege but also promotes many of
arbitration’s central tenets, such as finality and truth-seeking. Indeed, the
doctrine of immunity also promotes some aspects of fairness, namely the
goals of truth-telling and encouraging the redress of wrongs.
Others might argue that absolute immunity is less necessary in
arbitration given that the harm is less (private dispute resolution vs. public
dispute resolution) and that allowing private suits for defamation would be
the best way to deal with misconduct in the forum. Allowing judicial
recourse for arbitral wrongs, however, would turn a private dispute
resolution process into a public one, as well as undermine the finality of the
process.

60
Edna Sussman & Victoria A. Kummer, Drafting the Arbitration Clause: A Primer on the Opportunities
and Pitfalls, DISP. RESOL. J., Feb.–Apr. 2012, at 30, 35 (explaining that arbitration is intended to be a “swift and
efficient alternative dispute resolution process,” and a truncated discovery period helps promote these
efficiencies); see also Judy Rost et al., Comparative International Perspectives of Arbitration in the Franchising
Context, 31 FRANCHISE L.J. 124, 127 (2012) (noting that discovery can be expensive in U.S. litigation and that
the arbitration procedure is intended to cut down on much of that cost).
61
See Rost et al., supra note 60, at 127.
62
See Sussman & Kummer, supra note 60, at 35 (“Before [measures to limit discovery] are added to the
arbitration agreement, care must be taken to think through the nature, size, and complexity of the likely disputes
and determine the procedures necessary to obtain a fair result.”).
63
See 29 C.F.R. § 4221.5(a) (2013) (noting that arbitration hearings under this regulation are conducted in
the same manner as an arbitration hearing under Title 9 of the United States Code).
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The provision of immunity to the arbitral forum, however, shields the
participants from litigation for wrongdoing in the forum. If no enforcement
mechanism exists for righting “wrongdoing,” then the arbitral forum has the
potential to breed unethical behavior. Due to confidentiality associated
with the forum and the limited amount of review, unethical behavior in
arbitration could go unchecked. In the litigation forum, this type of
misconduct is remedied through the use of the criminal law. As the next
Part outlines, the rules regarding perjury and tampering do not apply to the
arbitral forum (or at least, not without some creative lawyering), thus
leaving arbitration as a forum in which wrongs cannot be corrected or
righted, leaving arbitration in a precarious ethical position.
III. HOW THE CRIMINAL LAW FAILS TO REACH ARBITRATION
The criminal laws play an important function in the American justice
system. Witnesses must swear under oath and “penalty of perjury” before
providing testimony, and the criminal law further criminalizes the
destruction of evidence and tampering with witnesses.64 These criminal
laws provide a basis for prosecution for wrongdoing and, more importantly,
provide a valuable deterrent to keep people from engaging in bad behaviors
in the litigation process.65 These criminal laws, then, provide a backstop to
ensure that the litigation process is fair.
Unfortunately, these criminal laws often do not apply directly to arbitral
proceedings. Although creative lawyers can argue that the criminal law
might apply to arbitration,66 none of them apply explicitly to arbitration.67
This Part demonstrates the gap in the criminal law in this area, concluding
that fundamental fairness requires that the criminal law apply in arbitration.
A. Perjury
Perjury is injurious to any system that engages in the administration of
justice. Lying undermines the administration of justice and puts the truthful
parties at a disadvantage. In addition, public confidence in dispute

64

See Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 933.
Id.
66
Often, the statutes dealing with perjury and tampering are found in a section of the criminal code
dealing with “Offenses Against Public Administration.” See MODEL PENAL CODE arts. 240–43 (1962).
This terminology stems from the Model Penal Code, which organized these laws under that title. See id.
67
Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 933.
65
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resolution decreases if the process does not have procedural safeguards.68
Lying in arbitration would presumably be just as injurious to the
administration of justice in arbitration as it is in the public system of
litigation. The perjury laws, however, do not explicitly apply to the arbitral
forum.69
Many states’ definitions of perjury include a requirement that the lying
occur under oath in an “official proceeding.”70 Often, the definition of
“official proceeding” only extends to “legislative, judicial, administrative or
other governmental agency” proceedings.71 States that use this definition of
“official proceeding” include: Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,
Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah,
and Washington.72 These statutes are ambiguous, at best, as to whether they
apply in arbitration. Another handful of states prohibit lying under oath
more generally.
These states include: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New York, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
and Virginia.73 These types of definitions are more likely to apply to

68
Mark Curriden, The Lies Have It, A.B.A. J., May 1995, at 68, 69 (quoting former ABA Section
of Litigation chair David Weiner); see also John L. Watts, To Tell the Truth: A Qui Tam Action for
Perjury in a Civil Proceeding is Necessary to Protect the Integrity of the Civil Judicial System, 79
TEMP. L. REV. 773, 784 (2006) (“While this reluctance to criminally prosecute perjury in civil cases may
be understandable, it is regrettable because perjury undermines the real and perceived legitimacy of the
civil judicial system.”) (citation omitted).
69
Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 933.
70
See sources cited infra note 72.
71
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.0(4).
72
ALA. CODE §§ 13A-10-100, -101 (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-8-501, -502 (2010); CONN.
GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-146, -156 (2010); FLA. STAT. § 837.02 (2010); HAWAII. REV. STAT. §§ 710-1000, 1060 (2010); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/32-3(a) (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5903(a)(1) (2010); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 523.010(3), .020 (West 2010); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A §§ 451(1), 451(5) (2010);
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 492.040, 575.010 (2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-7-201 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-915(1), -916 (2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 641:1 (2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-25-1, 30-112(G) (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-11-01 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2921.01(D), -.11(A)
(West 2010); 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4902 (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-501(1), -502 (West
2010); WASH REV. CODE §§ 9A.72.010(4), -.020 (2010).
73
ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.200 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-2-103 (2010); CAL. PENAL CODE §
118 (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1224 (2010); D.C. CODE § 22-2402(a) (2010); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 18-5401 (2010); IND. CODE § 35-44.1-2-1 (a)(1) (2010); IOWA CODE § 720.2 (2010); MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. LAW§ 9-101(a) (West 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.423 (2010); MINN. STAT. §
609.48(1) (2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-9-59 (2010); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.15 (McKinney 2010);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 491 (2010); ORE. REV. STAT. § 162. 065(1) (2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-33-1(a)
(2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-9-30 (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-29-1 (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. §
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arbitration. Wisconsin and New Jersey extend the perjury laws to
arbitration,74 while a minority of jurisdictions have an extraordinarily
narrow definition of “official proceedings.”75
Although creative lawyers could certainly argue that the definitions of
perjury extend to arbitration, a simple change in the law would make this
question infinitely clearer. Without a change in the law, however,
arbitrators must be keenly aware of the possibility of untruthful testimony
and dealing with that testimony in the ways discussed below. Without any
enforcement mechanism, arbitral awards based on untruthful testimony
would deny participants fundamental fairness and due process.
B. Tampering
Just as with the perjury laws, the tampering laws do not explicitly
extend to the arbitral forum. Most tampering laws only apply in an “official
proceeding,” and that definition likely does not explicitly extend to the
arbitral forum. The states utilizing a definition of tampering that includes
the “official proceeding” term include: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and

39-16-702(a)(1) (2010); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.02(a) (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-434
(2010).
74
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:28-1(a) (West 2010); WIS. STAT. § 946.31(d) (2010) .
75
18 U.S.C. § 1621(1) (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-70(a) (2010) (judicial proceedings only);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:123 (2010) (judicial or legislative proceedings); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268,
§ 1 (West 2010) (court proceedings); NEV. REV. STAT. § 199.120 (2010) (when oath required by law);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-209 (2010) (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2901 (2010) (court and agency
proceedings); W. VA. CODE § 61-5-1(a) (2010) (court proceedings); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-5-301(a)
(2010).
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Washington.76 In addition, and unlike the perjury laws, a handful of states
recognize a civil cause of action for tampering.77
Because these laws do not explicitly apply to arbitration, open
questions exist as to whether they are applicable in the arbitral forum at all.
While arbitrators can, and should, be mindful of the potential for
misbehavior in their own tribunals, no outside law requires witnesses and
parties to act in an ethical manner.78 Arbitrators who must make decisions
on limited records because of missing documents may skew the awards in
the wrongdoer, which seriously prejudices the victim party and leads to
unfairness in the forum. Certainly, the criminal law needs to catch up with

76
ALA. CODE § 13A-10-129 (2010); ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.610 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-2809 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-53-111 (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-8-610 (2010); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 53a-155 (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §1274 (2010); D.C. Code § 22-723 (2010);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 710-1076 (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-2603 (2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 524.100 (West 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.483a(5) (2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-9-125
(2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-7-207 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-922 (2010); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 641:6 (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:28:6 (West 2010); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.40 (McKinney
2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-09-03 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.12 (West 2010); OKLA
.STAT.tit. 21, § 454 (2010); ORE. REV. STAT. § 162.295 (2010); 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4910 (West 2010);
S.D. CODIFIIED LAWS § 19-7-14 (2010) (using the term “proceeding,” not “official proceeding”); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-16-503 (2010); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.09 (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 768-510.5 (West 2010) (including a catchall provision of “examination under oath”); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9A.72.150 (2010).
77
See Nichols v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 6 P.3d 300, 303 (Alaska 2000) (recognizing that the
tort of intentional spoliation of evidence exists under state law); Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710
A.2d 846, 849 (D.C. 1998) (establishing tort); Dardeen v. Kuehling, 821 N.E.2d 227, 232 (Ill. 2004)
(establishing tort); Desselle v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 887 So. 2d 524, 534 (La. Ct. App.
2004) (recognizing a tort of intentional spoliation); Manorcare Health Servs. v. Osmose Wood
Preserving, 764 A.2d 475, 479 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (noting that destruction of evidence
could result in a separate tort for spoliation, discovery sanctions, or an adverse inference); DiDomenico
v. C & S Aeromatik Supplies, Inc., 682 N.Y.S.2d 452, 460 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (noting availability of
tort); Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., Inc., 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1038 (Ohio 1993) (recognizing tort);
Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560, 568, 571 (W. Va. 2003) (recognizing tort). Some states expressly
reject this tort. See Tobel v. Travelers Ins. Co., 988 P.2d 148, 156 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999); Cedars-Sinai
Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 521 (Cal. 1998); Lucas v. Christiana Skating Ctr., Ltd., 722
A.2d 1247, 1250 (Del. 1998); Owens v. Am. Refuse. Sys., Inc., 536 S.E.2d 782, 784 (Ga. Ct. App.
2000); Monsanto Co. v. Reed, 950 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Ky. 1997); Fletcher v. Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co.,
773 N.E.2d 420, 424 (Mass. 2002); Panich v. Iron Wood Prods. Corp., 445 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1989); Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components, Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434, 436–37
(Minn. 1990); Dowdle Butane Gas Co. v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 1124, 1135 (Miss. 2002); Patel v. OMH
Med. Ctr., Inc., 987 P.2d 1185, 1202 (Okla. 1999); Elias v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 710 A.2d 65, 67–68
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tex. 1998); Estate of Neumann v.
Neumann, 626 N.W.2d 821, 841 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001).
78
See Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, 926.
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modern arbitration practice,79 and until that happens, arbitrators must be the
first line of defense to ensure a fair forum.80
C. Advancements in the Area of Legal Ethics
Although the criminal law has not yet caught up to modern arbitration
practice, the world of legal ethics has. Updates to the codes of legal ethics
have implemented the change noted above by simply adding the term
“arbitration” to the list of forums covered by the rules.81 While the criminal
law focuses on the term “official proceeding,” the legal ethics rules discuss
conduct before a “tribunal,” and since 2002, “tribunal” includes the arbitral
forum.82 When a lawyer practices before a “tribunal,” the lawyer may not
make a “false statement of fact or law” or “offer evidence that the lawyer
knows to be false.”83 Further, the ethics rules prohibit attorneys from
tampering, concealing, or obstructing another party’s access to evidence—
whether this evidence be used in a tribunal or not.84

79

See id. at 933.
See Steven C. Bennett, Who Is Responsible for Ethical Behavior by Counsel in Arbitration, DISP. RESOL.
J., May–July 2008, at 38, 42.
81
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(m) (2012) (“‘Tribunal’ denotes a court, an arbitrator
in a binding arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in
an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative
capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or
parties, will render a binding legal judgment directly affecting a party’s interests in a particular
matter.”).
82
Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 926 n.4.
83
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a) (2012). The following states adopted this, or a
substantially similar rule (found in Rule 3.3 of the respective state’s model rules, unless otherwise
noted): Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Florida (R. 4-3.3), Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa (R. 32:3.3), Kansas, Kentucky (KY.
SUP. CT. R. 3.130(3.3)), Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri (R. 4-3.3), Montana, Nebraska (R. 3-503.3), Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico (R. 16-303), New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas (R. 3.03), Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 (2000).
84
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2012); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 117 (2000). The following states adopted a version of Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.4 dealing with candor toward opposing counsel and parties (labeled as Rule 3.4,
unless otherwise noted): Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Florida (R. 4-3.4), Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa (R. 32:3.4),
Kansas, Kentucky (Ky. Sup. Ct. R. 3.130(3.4)), Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Missouri (R. 4-3.4), Montana, Nebraska (R. 3-503.4), Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico (R. 16-304), New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas (R. 3.04), Utah, Vermont,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
80
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Clearly, legal ethics have caught up with modern alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) practice, and the drafters of Ethics 2000 should be
commended for this realization. Despite this advancement, legal ethics
rules are only a small piece of the puzzle. These rules only apply to
lawyers, not other participants,85 and the remedies are usually limited to
disciplinary measures against the attorney.86 While lawyers should be
counted on to act in an ethical manner, they do not always do so.87 Small
changes to the criminal law would do a lot to fill the gap in the law.
IV. THE HIGH BURDEN OF PROOF ADDS TO THE ETHICAL QUANDARY
Adding to the ethical questions posed by the application of the criminal
law to arbitration is the fact that the burden of proof for the ethical
wrongdoings of participants is unwarrantedly more stringent than for any
other type of judicial review for arbitration awards. While I have
previously argued that this review is not supported by policy,88 arbitrators
must keep this fact in mind when considering what to do with unethical
behavior in the forum.89 If arbitrators better understand the lack of recourse
available for these types of participant infractions, hopefully they will be
more inclined to deal with these problems in the first instance.90
As a general matter, the law rightfully limits the ability to challenge an
arbitration award.91 Limited judicial review discourages post-award
challenges and helps promote finality.92 Across the country, less than one
in five awards are ever vacated, further discouraging parties from seeking
vacatur.93 An award can only be vacated under the most limited
circumstances. Those grounds include: (1) when the award is procured by
“corruption, fraud, or undue means,” (2) the arbitrators are biased, (3) the
arbitrator engages in procedural misconduct, or (4) the arbitrators exceed

85

Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 926 n.4.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope cmt. 20 (2012).
87
See, e.g., In re David, 690 S.E.2d 579, 581–82 (S.C. 2010); In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against
Carmick, 48 P.3d 311, 323 (Wash. 2002); In re Jordan, 623 N.E.2d 1372, 1375 (Ill. 1993).
88
See Blankley, Arbitration Ethics II, supra note 19 (manuscript at 39–40).
89
See Bennett, supra note 80, at 40.
90
See Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 926 n.4 (noting Model Rules of Professional
Conduct apply only to attorneys, not other arbitration participants).
91
See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012).
92
See Plymouth-Carver Reg'l Sch. Dist. v. J. Farmer & Co., Inc., 553 N.E.2d 1284, 1285 (Mass. 1990)
(“The policy of limited judicial review is reflective of the strong public policy favoring arbitration as an
expeditious alternative to litigation for setting commercial disputes.”).
93
Lawrence R. Mills et al., Vacating Arbitration Awards, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2005, at 23, 24.
86

2014]

Lying, Stealing, and Cheating

461

their powers.94 These statutory grounds largely consider procedural
irregularities, as opposed to the correctness of the decision.95 Section
10(a)(1) is the only grounds for review based on misconduct on the part of
someone other than the arbitrator.96 In addition, some jurisdictions
recognize two additional grounds for review, which are when an arbitrator’s
award evidences a “manifest disregard of the law” or is “contrary to public
policy,” although the continuing validity of these judicially-created grounds
for review is uncertain given recent Supreme Court precedents.97 These
two grounds also deal exclusively with arbitrator conduct (i.e., decisionmaking).98
For the most part, district courts review the cases de novo to determine
whether the grounds for vacatur exist.99 This is true for every standard of
review other than § 10(a)(1), which deals with participant misconduct.100

94

9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
See Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1103,
1116 (2009).
96
See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1).
97
Over the past few years, the Supreme Court has given indications that only the four enumerated
grounds for review listed in § 10(a) of the FAA can be used to vacate an arbitration award, and not these
judicially created grounds. In Hall Street Associates, L.L.C., v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008), the
Supreme Court held that parties could not contract for a standard of review greater than that prescribed
in § 10(a). See id. at 590. The Court left open the possibility that courts could review an award based
on standards other than those in the statute. See id. The Court acknowledged, but did not resolve this
issue again in Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 559 U.S.. 662 (2010). See id. at
672 & n.3. For the purposes of this Chapter, whether these grounds exist is immaterial because these
grounds of review deal with an arbitrator’s award, as opposed to the conduct of an opposing party or
witness. See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16.
In the 2012 decision of Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012), the
United States Supreme Court reversed a decision by the West Virginia Supreme Court invalidating
certain nursing home contracts as violative of public policy. Id. at 1202. While never stating that the
public policy exception does not exist, the Court struck down the West Virginia decision as preempted
by the Federal Arbitration Act—thus leaving in doubt whether any public policy exception based on
state law would not be preempted. See id. at 1204.
98
See Blankley, Arbitration Ethics II, supra note 19 (manuscript at 41–42) (“[T]hese two additional
grounds delve deeper into the arbitrator’s decision-making power.”).
99
Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 980.
100
See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 671–72 (discussing § 10(a)(4) without ever discussing a higher
burden of proof); Rame, L.L.C. v. Popovich, 878 F. Supp. 2d 439, 443–44 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (discussing the
narrowness of the “manifest disregard” grounds of review without discussing a higher burden of proof); CrozerChester Med. Ctr. v. Crozer-Chester Nurses Assoc., No. 11-7300, 2012 WL 2500930, at *4–5 (E.D. Pa. June 29,
2012) (applying a de novo standard to determine if the case fell within the narrow review); Ardalan v. Macy’s
Inc., No. 5:09-cv-04894 JW, 2012 WL 2503972, at *3–5 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2012) (utilizing a higher burden of
proof under § 10(a)(1) than under § 10(a)(2) for evident partiality); Urban Assocs., Inc. v. Standex Elecs, Inc.,
No. 4:04-CV-40059, 2012 WL 1079723, at *8–11 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 17, 2012) (applying de novo standard of
review under § 10(a)(2)); MPJ v. Aero Sky, L.L.C., 673 F. Supp. 2d 475, 484–86 (2009) (applying a higher
burden of proof under § 10(a)(1) than under § 10(a)(3)); In re Arbitration Before the N.Y. Stock Exchange, Inc.,
No. 04 Civ. 488(RWS), 2004 WL 2072460, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2004) (applying a de novo standard
95
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For cases dealing with participant misconduct, the case law has developed a
significantly higher standard of proof, in addition to the narrow grounds for
vacatur.101
Under § 10(a)(1), an arbitration award can be vacated if the moving
party can establish “corruption, fraud, or undue means” on the part of any
arbitration participant—i.e., the section is not limited to arbitrators.102
These are the only grounds for review available to challenge an award on
the basis of participant conduct other than the arbitrator.103 As the federal
common law developed under § 10(a)(1), the courts added a requirement
that the standard be met by “clear and convincing evidence.”104 More than
likely, this higher evidentiary burden stems from the fact that to prove a
cause of action for fraud requires a burden of “clear and convincing”
evidence.105 This heightened burden, however, is completely unwarranted
because the parties are seeking no greater relief than vacatur under any
other section.106 Unlike a cause of action for fraud, the parties cannot get
civil damages—or punitive damages—on a motion for vacatur based on
fraud.107
As noted in my previous scholarship, removing the heightened burden
would best comport with the interests of justice and due process.108 Being a
realist, however, I recognize that the courts are unlikely to change their
judicially-created tests. Given these significant ethical questions, this paper
recommends that arbitrators take a more active role as the ethics enforcers
within their own forum, even when this requirement is uncomfortable or
jeopardizes an arbitrator’s future employment as a paid neutral.

under § 10(a)(3)).
101
Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 932.
102
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) (2012).
103
See id. § 10(a)(1).
104
Lafarge Conseils Et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp., 791 F.2d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir.
1986) (vacating only if the alleged “fraud” was (1) not discoverable upon the exercise of due diligence prior to
the arbitration, (2) materially related to an issue in the arbitration, and (3) established by clear and convincing
evidence); see also Smith West, L.L.C. v. Mohnach Payne Inc., No. 1 CA-CV 09-0568, 2010 WL 2471051, at
*2 (Ariz. Ct. App. June 17, 2010) (“[A] party seeking to vacate an arbitration award claiming fraud must show
‘that the fraud was (1) not discoverable upon the exercise of due diligence prior to the arbitration, (2) materially
related to an issue in the arbitration, and (3) established by clear and convincing evidence.’”) (citing Lafarge
Conseils Et Etudes, S.A., 791 F.2d at 1339). This test appears to be the test that a majority of the courts employ
when confronted with a motion for vacatur on the grounds of fraud while other tests are employed in a minority
of jurisdictions. See, e.g., Prof'l Builders, Inc. v. Sedan Floral, Inc., 819 P.2d 1254, 1258 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991)
(“‘As a general rule any fraud or misconduct having a tendency to affect the award improperly will vitiate it and
render it subject to impeachment.’”) (quoting 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 202 (2013)).
105
See, e.g., Flora v. Kingsbridge Homes, 625 N.Y.S.2d 680, 681 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (requiring “clear
and convincing evidence” to “state a cause of action for fraud”).
106
Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 981–82.
107
See id. at 982.
108
Blankley, Arbitration Ethics II, supra note 19 (manuscript at 63–64).
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V. ARBITRATORS AS ETHICS ENFORCERS
Arbitrators, as hearing presiders, are the natural first line of defense for
dealing with unethical conduct within their own forum. Given the
uncertainty of the applicability of the criminal law109 and the extraordinarily
high burden for vacatur,110 the arbitrator stands at the perfect position for
dealing with ethics abuses. The role of ethics enforcer may be not only
unfamiliar for arbitrators but also uncomfortable. Arbitrators who are party
chosen and party paid, may be less likely to find unethical conduct for a
whole host of reasons, including a belief that the people who hired them are
“good” attorneys, a fear (legitimate or not) of fewer future referrals, and a
fear (legitimate or not) of disappointing the same people who hired
them. In order to provide a fair forum, however, an arbitrator needs to be
vigilant and responsive to unethical conduct in the forum.
This Part considers three primary reasons why arbitrators should be
acting as ethics enforcers. First, arbitrators have always been put in this
role, whether or not they would have called themselves “ethics
enforcers.”111 Second, arbitrators are in the best position to handle these
types of issues, either on motion or sua sponte, because they are closest to
the issue and can better assess participant credibility.112 Third, arbitrators
have a myriad of tools available at their disposal to deal with participant
misconduct that other venues do not have.113 This Part considers these three
areas in greater detail.
A. Historically, Arbitrators Acted in This Role
As a historical matter, the law and the courts have been relatively
“hands off” regarding arbitration issues. This treatment is unsurprising
given that the primary purpose of arbitration is to provide an alternative
forum to resolve disputes. With no one assuming the role of overseeing
arbitration, arbitrators must be responsible for managing their own tribunal
and correcting wrongdoing within the forum.114

109

Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 926.
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 671 (2010) (“Petitioners contend that the
decision of the arbitration panel must be vacated, but in order to obtain that relief, they must clear a high
hurdle.”).
111
See infra Part V.A.
112
See infra Part V.B.
113
See infra Part V.B.
114
Bennett, supra note 80, at 42.
110
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1. Federal Law Provides Little Guidance on Arbitration
The laws governing arbitration are extraordinarily sparse. The FAA for
instance, contains a mere sixteen provisions and that have remained largely
unchanged since 1925.115 The FAA, for the most part, does not deal with
the actions of the arbitrator within the tribunal.116 The first four provisions
of the FAA deal with the “front end” of arbitration law—or how a case gets
into arbitration.117 These first four sections make agreements to arbitrate
enforceable by specific performance,118 provide for a stay of litigation filed
in the federal district courts in lieu of arbitration,119 and allow courts to
issue orders compelling the parties to arbitrate.120 Four of the last
provisions of the FAA deal with “back end” issues relating to the
confirmation and vacatur of arbitral awards.121 As discussed above,122
arbitration awards must be confirmed by a court, unless they are vacated or
modified under the narrow grounds provided by the FAA.123
With respect to what actually occurs in arbitration, the FAA is
amazingly silent. The FAA provides that a court can appoint an arbitrator if
the parties are unable to do so.124 In addition, the FAA gives arbitrators a
subpoena power that allows them to compel the presence of witnesses and
the production of documents for use in an arbitration hearing.125 These two

115
As originally enacted, the FAA contained fourteen provisions. Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified
as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012)). In 1970, Congress enacted Chapter Two of the FAA to deal with the
enforceability of international arbitration awards. Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (1970) (codified at 9 U.S.C.
§§ 201–208 (2012)). Chapter Two, however, does not deal with domestic arbitration or with the workings of the
arbitral tribunal at all. See id.
116
See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16.
117
See id. §§ 1–4.
118
Id. § 2 (“A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.”) (emphasis added).
119
Id. § 3 (“If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any
issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing . . . , the court in which such suit is pending, .
. . shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had
in accordance with the terms of the agreement . . . .”).
120
Id. § 4 (“[T]he court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in
accordance with the terms of the agreement.”).
121
See id. §§ 9–12.
122
Id. § 9.
123
Id. §§ 9–11.
124
Id. § 5 (allowing a court to appoint an arbitrator if the parties’ own selection method does not
result in the appointment of an arbitrator or if other reasons exist as to why the parties cannot determine
on their own who will arbitrate their dispute).
125
Id. § 7 (providing subpoena power).
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provisions are the only provisions dealing with the hearing itself (and even
including § 5 on the appointment of arbitrators is somewhat of a stretch).126
Otherwise, the FAA is silent on how an arbitrator should conduct an
arbitration hearing.127
Notably, the FAA says absolutely nothing about arbitration procedure
or evidentiary burdens. The FAA contains no provisions regarding
discovery, besides those noted above regarding subpoenaing persons and
documents.128 Thus, the FAA gives the arbitrators little guidance on issues
such as prehearing exchanges of documents between the parties,
depositions, and interrogatories.129 In addition, the FAA is silent on the
issue of what constitutes admissible evidence.130 The only guidance that
arbitrators have stems from FAA § 10, dealing with vacatur.131 Under §
10(a)(3), an arbitration award may be subject to vacatur if the arbitrator
refuses to consider evidence that is “pertinent and material to the
controversy.”132 With this guidance arbitrators are likely to admit all
evidence to help insulate the decision from vacatur.133 Citing this section,
arbitrators often admit all evidence—with the caveat—“for what it’s
worth.”134 If a close question exists with respect to allegedly fraudulent
evidence or perjured testimony, the unfortunate outcome is that the
evidence will likely be admitted “for what it’s worth,” with the hope that
the arbitrator would later determine that the evidence actually is not of any
probative value. Clearly, though, the pressure felt on arbitrators to admit
evidence could have the effect of making the forum even less fair,
especially if the arbitrators are not vigilant in determining the veracity of
witnesses and the genuineness of documents.

126

See id. §§ 1–16.
See id.
See id. Admittedly, the FAA was enacted prior to our modern rules of procedure, which were
first enacted in 1938. Jay S. Goodman, On the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: What Did the Drafters Intend?, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 351, 351–52 (1987). The current
system of full discovery before trial was certainly not the norm at the time of the FAA’s passage. See id.
129
See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16.
130
See id. § 7 (discussing only the materiality of evidence).
131
See id. § 10.
132
Id. § 10(a)(3).
133
See id. § 10.
134
See, e.g., Bernstein v. On-Line Software Int’l, Inc., 648 N.Y.S.2d 602, 604 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); 1
GRENIG, supra note 38, § 8:61; Marvin F. Hill, Jr. & Tammy M. Westhoff, “I’ll Take It for What It Is Worth”—
The Use of Hearsay Evidence by Labor Arbitrators: A Primer and Modest Proposal, 1998 J. DISP. RESOL. 1
(1998); Evan J. Spelfogel, Legal and Practical Implications of ADR and Arbitration in Employment Disputes, 11
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 247, 266 (1993).
127
128
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The FAA does not impose any types of evidentiary burdens of proof or
any requirement that the arbitrators follow the law.135 Arbitration is known
as a tribunal of equity, and the arbitrator’s flexibility in applying the law or
the business custom has long been a reason why parties choose
arbitration.136 Unfortunately, this flexibility, if unchecked, could create a
forum that is hospitable to ethics abuses.
Just as the FAA fails to address issues regarding procedure and
evidentiary burdens, the FAA is also largely silent on the issue of wrongful
conduct within the forum. The only hint of federal law dealing with
unethical conduct can be found in the review provision, § 10(a)(1),
discussed above,137 that allows vacatur of an arbitral award for “corruption,
fraud, or undue means”138 committed by an arbitration participant.
Arbitrator misconduct is also grounds for vacatur.139 The FAA does not
define “corruption,” “fraud,” or “undue means,” or give any guidance as to
how these matters should be handled before or during the arbitration.140
The FAA’s silence on nearly all matters dealing with the arbitral
process gives arbitrators and parties flexibility and creativity within the
forum.141 Parties can then craft a process that meets their needs, and
arbitrators can enforce the procedure chosen by contract in the manner that
they see fit.142 With regard to ethical misconduct, the lack of statutory and
common law gives arbitrators great flexibility to police their own tribunals
if they choose to exercise that flexibility.143 If arbitrators abide by their

135

See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16.
See John Arrastia, Jr. & Christi L. Underwood, Arbitration v. Litigation: You Control the Process v. The
Process Controls You, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2009–Jan. 2010, at 31, 32–34; Margaret Moses, Can Parties Tell
Courts What to Do? Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 429, 443 (2004); Jessica
Richardson & Rebekah Barlow Yalcinkaya, Speed, Efficiency and Flexibility: A Call to Return to Arbitration’s
Traditional Roots, 9 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 111 (2009).
137
See supra notes 102–07 and accompanying text.
138
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1).
139
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2)–(4).
140
See id. § 10.
141
See, e.g., Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989)
(noting that the parties have the ability to set their own choice-of-law clause given the FAA’s silence on the
issue); see also Michelle Eviston & Richard Bales, Capping the Costs of Consumer and Employment Arbitration,
42 U. TOL. L. REV. 903, 905 (2011) (noting with criticism that the FAA’s silence on the issue of fees consumers
can pay for arbitration services leads to a situation in which varying arbitrators and provider organizations charge
different amounts for those services); R. Jeremy Sugg, Interim Relief and International Commercial Arbitration
in North Carolina: Where We Are and Where We Should Be Looking, 30 CAMPBELL L. REV. 389, 398–99
(2008) (noting the wide gaps in the FAA and discussing the need for states to fill in issues of arbitration
procedure where the FAA does not specifically speak to the issues).
142
See sources cited supra note 141.
143
See supra Parts IV, V.A.1.
136
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powers as stated in the contract, they have considerable control over the
process.144 Given their position, they should be the first line of defense in
dealing with ethical issues arising in the forum. Of course, the arbitrators
must recognize this duty and take action despite monetary and social
pressure to let things slide.
2. State Law Is Likewise Liberal on Regulating Arbitration Conduct
For the most part, the state law of arbitration mimics the federal law of
arbitration. Interestingly, Congress modeled the FAA after the New York
Arbitration Act, and the states and the federal government have long
simultaneously regulated arbitration.145 At the time of the enactment of the
FAA, the common law of arbitration and state laws governed.146 By the
mid-1950s, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws convened and promulgated the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA).147
As this section notes, neither the UAA nor the preceding statutory or
common law gave much attention to the issue of participant ethics.148
3. Early Statutory and Common Law Did Not Address
Issues of Ethics
For the most part, the common law and state statutes in place around
the time of the passage of the FAA were silent on the issue of ethics. As a
practical matter, arbitrations at the time consisted largely of merchant
disputes (i.e., business to business disputes) that disputed issues relating to
goods sold (quality, timeliness, quantity, etc.).149 The arbitrators issued

144

See sources cited supra note 141.
See David Horton, Unconscionability Wars, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 387, 406 (2012) (noting how the drafter
of the FAA drafted the legislation modeled on the New York law); Rhonda Wasserman, Legal Process in a Box,
or What Class Action Waivers Teach Us About Law-Making, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 391, 395 (2012) (describing
the FAA as having been “[m]odeled after statutes enacted in New Jersey and New York”); David M. Sholl, Note,
It’s My Party and I’ll Arbitrate if I Want To: Are We Signing Away Our Right to Litigate Tort Claims?, 37 NOVA
L. REV. 205, 213 (2012) (noting how the FAA was modeled after New York law already in effect at the time).
146
See Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration’s Finality Through Functional Analysis,
37 GA. L. REV. 123, 141 (2002) (noting how “courts used public policy and contract interpretation to prevent
arbitration and enforcement of awards under varied state laws that applied before uniform acceptance of the
FAA/UAA model.”).
147
Id. at 153.
148
See id. at 154.
149
See Michael L. Rustad et al., An Empirical Study of Predispute Mandatory Arbitration Clauses
in Social Media Terms of Service Agreements, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 643, 675 (2012)
(noting that the “original intended use of the FAA was for the business community to regulate among its
members”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing
145
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awards based on equity and business norms, not necessarily the law.150 At
that time, arbitrators often worked as full-time tradesmen (not lawyers) who
understood the norms of the particular industry at hand.151 Thus, the laws in
place retained flexibility to deal with these types of trade and business
disputes.152
At common law, no subpoena power existed for arbitrators, and
arbitrators could not compel the attendance of witnesses or the production
of documents.153 While many states had statutory law allowing for
compulsory process, the right was not uniform across the nation at that
time.154 A treatise from 1930 (published five years after the passage of the
FAA) expresses concern about parties trying to curry favor with the
arbitrators through bribery and other bad actions.155 The treatise also
mentions that inappropriate contact with the arbitrators—both in terms of
hospitality offered and ex parte communications—could subject an
arbitration award to later vacatur by the courts.156 With respect to party
misconduct affecting evidence, the treatise contemplates the possibility and
guesses that an award based on such trickery and deceit would be subject to
vacatur:
It remains to observe the case where a party resorts to false evidence
and trickery to win his case. Is a party under any obligation to act in good
faith and aid the arbitrators, as lay judges of his own choosing, to an
honest judgment upon the merits of the case? Rules of the law of evidence
and court procedure . . . are largely removed. If a party may not subserve
his own ends by bribes, secret influence and surreptitious reports against
the adverse party, may he, notwithstanding, take the benefit of perjured
evidence and trickery in the formal presentation of his case before lay
arbitrators? Strange as it seems, the cases are not entirely in accord upon
this question. The prevailing view, however, is that a party may not have
the benefit of his perjury and trickery; his award will be vacated for such
Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239, 240–41 (2012) (noting that traditional arbitration involves
self-regulation within the normative community of a trade association).
150
See Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 849 (1961) (describing
arbitration within a trade association).
151
Id. at 854 (“Mercantile disputes have been decided by merchants in the Anglo-American world
since at least the thirteenth century.”).
152
See id. at 854–55.
153
WESLEY A. STURGES, A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS 390 (1930).
154
See id. at 391–420 (citing statutes in Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nevada, North Carolina, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
155
Id. at 472 (“Bribery, by a party, of any one of the arbitrators is, of course, sufficient cause to
invalidate an award rendered in favor of such party.”).
156
Id. at 473–74.
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157

This passage is particularly interesting because it recognizes the
possibility for participant misconduct, but does not discuss the arbitrator’s
role in dealing with the wrongdoing.158 These passages from the 1930
treatise consist primarily of the courts’ response to unethical conduct after
the fact and not on dealing with the conduct in the first instance at the
tribunal level.159
Although arbitrators have significant discretion in conducting their
hearings, arbitrators at the time did not believe they had any real discretion
to exclude evidence.160 Because the rules regarding vacatur allow a party to
vacate an award on the arbitrator’s refusal to consider evidence (as opposed
to considering improper evidence),161 arbitrators at the time of the passage
of the FAA were, like present-day arbitrators, particularly unlikely to
exclude evidence under any circumstances.162 This preference towards
admitting evidence particularly hurts parties acting in good faith because
they are abiding by the rules, while a less scrupulous participant is stacking
the deck in his favor.
Perhaps one of the reasons why the idea of perjury was lacking from the
discussion of arbitrator powers at the time of the passage of the FAA was
because witnesses at the hearings were not (and still are not) required to
testify under oath.163 If no oath is given, then witnesses cannot possibly
commit perjury, which requires a false statement under oath.164 Even if an
oath was administered, courts at the time of the passage of the FAA were
hesitant to find perjury within the arbitral forum.165 The Sturges treatise
cites a Missouri case from 1837, in which the court found that no action for

157

Id. at 474 (citing cases from Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Maine, Michigan, New
Hampshire, Oregon, West Virginia, and Tennessee).
158
See id.
159
See source cited supra notes 155–58.
160
STURGES, supra note 153, at 480. In fact, many state statutes at the time required arbitrators to
hear all evidence brought before the tribunal, using the mandatory “shall” language. See id. at 483–86
(citing statutes from Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, and Wisconsin
for the proposition of mandatory consideration of evidence by the tribunal).
161
See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (2012); see also STURGES, supra note 153, at 486 (citing the following
states as having a vacatur provision similar to FAA Section 10: California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho,
Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Wyoming).
162
See sources cited supra note 161.
163
STURGES, supra note 153, at 486 (“Apparently it is not necessary for witnesses to be sworn in a
common law arbitration unless the parties require it.”).
164
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1254 (9th ed. 2009).
165
See STURGES, supra note 153, at 487.
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perjury could exist despite alleged lying “under oath” because the oath was
“‘voluntary,’” “‘extrajudicial,’” and otherwise not required.166 The treatise
rightfully expresses concerns about the holding of the Missouri case and
posits that an oath administered in a jurisdiction that gives the arbitrators
discretion to require testimony under oath might not be considered
“voluntary” or “extrajudicial.”167
Again, these sources largely concern the interplay between the courts
and the arbitral tribunal and the effect of wrongdoing on an ultimate arbitral
award. These sources do not say anything about the powers of the
arbitrators in administrating their own tribunals. Perhaps the silence on the
issue is obvious in that arbitrators have control over their tribunals and can
exercise the authority that they wish, provided that it does not include the
wrongful exclusion of evidence.168 Although these sources provide little
guidance, they are instructive in that the primary legal concerns were not on
the happenings of the arbitral tribunal, but on the legal ramifications of
arbitrator actions and awards.169
4. Uniform Arbitration Act Adds Little Guidance on the Issue
In the 1950s, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws promulgated the UAA, which was approved by the House of
Delegates of the American Bar Association in 1956.170 Ultimately, all fifty
states adopted the UAA, or a similar version of the arbitration laws.171
Like the FAA, the UAA is a relatively short piece of legislation that
covers the “front end” and the “back end” issues dealing with arbitration.
The UAA provides that agreements to arbitrate are valid and specifically
enforceable.172 The UAA allows for the appointment of arbitrators when
the parties have been unable to do so,173 and it specifies that the decision of
a majority of the panel will be controlling on the parties, unless the contract

166

Id. (quoting Mahan v. Berry, 5 Mo. 21 (1837)).
Id. at 487–88 (citing statutes from Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho,
Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, Tennessee, and
Washington).
168
Id. at 480.
169
See sources cited supra notes 155–58, 160–61, 163, 165 – 67.
170
UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT intro. (1956), available at https://www.aaau.org/media/5046/uniform%20arbitr
ation%20act.pdf.
171
83 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D The Arbitration Contract—Making It and Breaking It § 32 (2005).
172
UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT §§ 1–2 (making agreements to arbitrate valid and providing courts a
mechanism to compel arbitration).
173
Id. § 3 (allowing appointment of arbitrators).
167
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between the parties provides otherwise.174 Unlike the FAA, the UAA
provides limited rules for arbitrators creating and changing awards,175 but
like the FAA, the UAA provides for the courts’ involvement in confirming,
vacating, and modifying an arbitration award.176
The UAA gives arbitrators slightly more guidance on the hearing and
prehearing procedures than the FAA. The UAA provides that parties may
be represented by counsel,177 cross-examine witnesses at the hearing,
present evidence on their case,178 and obtain prehearing discovery in the
form of subpoenas and depositions.179 While these statutes provide some
guidance on the issue of how arbitrators should preside over their tribunals,
that guidance is limited and does not address the issue of ethics
violations.180 Again, the only indication of what to do in the event of ethics
issues is in the review provision, which also allows for vacatur on the basis
of “corruption, fraud or other undue means.”181 This provision, however,
does not deal with the actions of the arbitrators at the tribunal, but the
interaction between the tribunal and the courts.182
Thus, again, the arbitrators do not have a lot of guidance from the states
on these issues. Perhaps the reason for the silence is the unspoken
assumption that arbitrators are given wide latitude and discretion over the
hearings themselves.183 Certainly, the statutory law (both federal and state)
gives the arbitrators wide discretion due to the silence.184 In other words,
statutory law does not prohibit the arbitrators from taking on the role of
ethics enforcer. In fact, given the limited guidance on the issue, arbitrators
are undoubtedly in the best position to do so. If arbitrators do not assume
this role, no one will, and the forum will slowly devolve into one not worth
using.

174

Id. § 4 (regarding majority rule of arbitrators).
Id. §§ 8–10 (describing requirements for the award; allowing arbitrators to modify or correct awards in
certain instances; and requiring the arbitrators to account for the payment of arbitration fees and expenses in the
award).
176
Id. §§ 11–13 (dealing with confirmation of award; dealing with vacating an award; and allowing for
modification of the award under limited circumstances); see also id. §§ 14–18 (dealing with administrative issues
relating to court involvement on motions before the court on arbitration issues).
177
Id. § 6 (allowing for representation of counsel throughout the arbitration process).
178
Id. § 5(b) (regarding hearing procedures).
179
Id. § 7 (regarding witnesses, subpoenas, and depositions).
180
See id. §§ 1–25.
181
Id. § 12.
182
See id.
183
See infra Part V.B.1–11. See generally UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT §§ 1–25.
184
See supra note 183.
175
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B. Arbitrators Are in the Best Position To Deal with Ethics Issues
Without a doubt, arbitrators are in the best position to deal with ethical
issues when they arise. Arbitrators can deal with any ethical issues during
the hearing, using a large number of tools to deal with the problems in the
first instance.185 Arbitrators can address any of these issues upon a motion
or inquiry by a party, but they are also able to raise the issue sua sponte if
they choose.186 Given the extraordinarily limited interaction between the
arbitral forum and the courts, including the limited grounds for review,
handling wrongful arbitration conduct within the forum itself may be the
only way for wrongdoing to be addressed. With the ambiguous nature of
the application of the laws on perjury, tampering, and other types of
obstruction to the arbitral forum, arbitrators must be vigilant and responsive
to participant misconduct.187 The arbitrators are, for the most part, the first
and last stop to deal with these types of issues.188 Only the rarest of cases
are overturned for participant “fraud,”189 and the criminal law will be of
little help for those seeking to right participant wrongs.190
Arbitrators are well equipped to deal with misconduct in the arbitral
forum, and they already have all of the tools that they need, if they choose
to do so. Perhaps arbitrators do not currently consider themselves to be
“ethics enforcers,” but they should.191 This section details the tools
available to arbitrators that can be used in order to best police the arbitral
forum—and these types of rules and regulations are already a part of our
modern arbitration system. This section first considers the rules of major
provider organizations giving the arbitrators considerable flexibility in
controlling the tribunal and maintaining decorum within the forum.
Arbitrators also have the power to assess credibility of witnesses and other
types of evidence, and they can impose certain burden-shifting analyses in
order to try to rectify participant misconduct. Finally, arbitrators do have

185

See infra Part V.B.1–11.
See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
187
See supra Part III.A–B.
188
See infra Part V.B.9.
189
Blankley, Arbitration Ethics II, supra note 19 (manuscript at 44).
190
See supra Part III.A–B.
191
In personal conversations regarding my previous two pieces on this topic, I heard from more than
one arbitrator that this type of conduct simply does not happen in arbitration. In fact, one arbitrator
noted that no unethical conduct existed in the “thirty years” the person was in the arbitral practice. The
idea that not a single person had lied under oath, hid a document, or otherwise acted in an improper
manner over the course of thirty years is simply unfathomable to me.
186
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the ability to award sanctions in egregious cases, and those awards will
likely be held up by a court if the award is challenged.
If arbitrators utilize these tools, they will help ensure that the forum is
fair and comports with the principles of due process and fundamental
fairness. While arbitrators bear the majority of the role in this process, the
arbitral providers can also help by creating clearer rules and engaging in
increased arbitrator education. This section considers these ideas in turn.
1. Provider Organization Rules
Arbitrations can be classified in one of two ways: institutional or ad
hoc.
An institutional arbitration is administered by a provider
organization,192 such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA),
Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS), the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), or the London Court of International
Arbitration (LCIA), to name a few. Ad hoc arbitration proceedings are
simply those that take place outside of an administrative institution.193
While the parties ultimately control whether they prefer an institutional
or an ad hoc arbitration proceeding, an institutional proceeding can provide
the parties with a number of benefits. Using a provider organization can
help with administrative tasks194 and may provide a decision-maker that has
been vetted by the institution.195 Perhaps the biggest reason parties choose
to have a provider organization administer the case is to ensure that the
proceeding is bound by a certain set of rules.196 Of course, some parties

192

See, e.g., Elizabeth Varner, Arbitrating Cultural Property Disputes, 13 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 477, 499 (2012) (“The agreement should state whether the parties want to use an arbitral
institution or ad hoc arbitration.”).
193
S.I. Strong, Navigating the Borders Between International Commercial Arbitration and U.S.
Federal Courts: A Jurisprudential GPS, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 119, 129 (2012) (“Arbitrations that are
not administered by an institutional body proceed ‘ad hoc.’”).
194
See Varner, supra note 192, at 499–500; see also Joseph T. McLaughlin & Kathleen M. Scanlon,
Updated: A Master Checklist For Drafting Contract Clauses in Transnational Matters, 27
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 97, 104 (2009) (noting that provider organizations can help with
administrative tasks as well as an award likely to withstand judicial scrutiny).
195
Maya Ganguly, Tribunals and Taxation: An Investigation of Arbitration in Recent US Tax
Conventions, 29 WISC. INT’L L.J. 735, 740–41 (2012) (noting that in the international sphere, awards of
arbitrators on the rosters of arbitral providers will likely be well regarded because of the standards in
place by the organizations).
196
See, e.g., Jack M. Graves, Arbitration as Contract: The Need for a Fully Developed and
Comprehensive Set of Statutory Legal Rules, 2 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 227, 278 (2011) (“There is
obviously a substantial difference between including fifteen pages of detailed arbitration procedures and
agreeing to arbitrate under a well-known set of institutional rules, which happen themselves to be fifteen
pages long.”); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and Choice: Taking Charge of the “New Litigation”,

474

UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:443

choose not to use an institutional provider because of cost and time
considerations.197 Even if parties are engaged in an ad hoc proceeding, they
can still choose to be bound to a certain provider organization’s rules.198 For
instance, parties to a contract for an ad hoc proceeding might still require
that “the arbitrator(s) follow AAA rules.”
As a general matter, provider organization rules give arbitrators an
extraordinary amount of flexibility in how they run their own tribunal. The
flexibility afforded to arbitrators extends to nearly all procedural matters,
including ruling on evidence or motions, swearing in witnesses, and other
issues relating to the orderly disposition of the arbitral process.199 This
section sets out rules from three major provider organizations, both
nationally200 and internationally,201 to demonstrate the great amount of
discretion afforded to arbitrators.

7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 383, 430 (2009) (“While arbitration need not be ‘administered,’ many
business parties prefer to incorporate the rules of an administering institution or ‘provider organization’
in their agreement.”).
197
See, e.g., Graves, supra note 196, at 278 (“The parties may be attempting to save money by omitting any
institutional reference. In fact, this is exactly why parties sometimes choose ad hoc over institutional
arbitration.”) (citations omitted). A common perception in the arbitration field is that an administered proceeding
will be more costly because of the added cost of administrative fees. See, e.g., id. Adding an administrator into
the dispute resolution process also potentially lengthens the process because of scheduling difficulties. See
McLaughlin & Scanlon, supra note 194, at 101–02. One study attempted to determine the costs differences in
institutional and ad hoc proceedings, but the study found no statistically significant correlation between the cost
of arbitration and whether the proceeding was administered by a provider organization. Big Spends, But Also Big
Awards: The Chartered Institute Surveys Arbitration Costs, 29 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 185, 185
(2011). In the study, approximately two-thirds of the cases used a provider organization, while the remaining
one-third were ad hoc arbitrations. Id.
198
Strong, supra note 193, at 129 (“[P]arties can decide to adopt procedural rules published by an
arbitral institution, even if the process is not administered by that organization. These arbitrations are
still referred to as ad hoc proceedings, even though they are governed by published procedural rules.
However, most published rule sets require any parties using those rules to have their arbitration
administered by the organization that promulgated the rules.”).
199
See id.
200
At the time of publication, the United States only has two major arbitration provider organizations, the
AAA and JAMS. See JON LEIBOWITZ ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM:
PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION, at *3, *29 (2010), available at
2010 WL 2788172. Previously, a third major provider, the National Arbitration Foundation, was extraordinarily
active in the area of consumer arbitration, but the NAF has become largely obsolete following a series of lawsuits
claiming that the NAF had improper ties with some of the repeat player debt-collection claimants. Id.; see also
Nancy A. Welsh, What is “(Im)partial Enough” in a World of Embedded Neutrals?, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 395, 405–
06 (2010); Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Turmoil in Arbitration Empire Upends Credit-Card Disputes, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 15, 2009, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB125548128115183913.
201
See About ICC, INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://www.iccwbo.org/about-icc/ (last visited Mar. 22,
2014).
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2. The American Arbitration Association
The AAA is quite possibly the largest arbitration provider organization
in the United States, so starting with the AAA makes sense. The AAA
develops and maintains over forty different sets of arbitration rules. AAA
rules generally apply to subject-matter specific disputes.202 For example,
the AAA has rules for commercial disputes, consumer disputes, real estate
disputes, insurance disputes, labor and employment disputes, health care
disputes, accounting disputes, and the like.203 Although many sets of rules
are similar, they are tailored to meet the special needs of different
industries.204 For the purpose of this discussion, however, a handful of rules
from across a wide variety of disputes will be used for illustrative purpose
to demonstrate the discretion afforded arbitrators as a matter of course.
Arbitrators have powers over their tribunals from the moment that they
are appointed. Prior to the hearing, AAA rules allow arbitrators
considerable flexibility to require parties to exchange information.205 This
type of flexibility allows arbitrators to resolve disputes about missing
documents and witnesses that arise prior to the hearing.206 Arbitrators could
use these types of rules to compel the production of documents and resolve
disputes regarding potential forgeries.207 Many of the AAA codes also
provide that an arbitrator can order “interim measures” that would allow for
the preservation of evidence.208 If an arbitrator were to hear that one party

See Search Rules, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, http://www.adr.org/aaa (follow “Rules and
Procedures” hyperlink; then follow “Rules” hyperlink).
203
See id. Currently, the AAA has seventy-four sets of rules. Id.
204
See id.
205
See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES
(INCLUDING PROCEDURES FOR LARGE, COMPLEX COMMERCIAL DISPUTES) R. 21 (2009) [hereinafter
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES] (detailing the “Exchange of Information” rule) (“(a) . . . [T]he arbitrator
may direct i) the production of documents and other information, and ii) the identification of any witnesses to be
called. . . . (c) The arbitrator is authorized to resolve any disputes concerning the exchange of information.”); see
also AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSTRUCTION ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES
(INCLUDING PROCEDURES FOR LARGE, COMPLEX CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES) R. 24 (2009) [hereinafter
CONSTRUCTION ARBITRATION RULES]; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, HEALTHCARE PAYOR PROVIDER
ARBITRATION RULES R. 20 (2011) [hereinafter HEALTHCARE ARBITRATION RULES]; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N,
INS. ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES R. 16 (2008) [hereinafter INS. ARBITRATION RULES];
AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, WILLS AND TRUSTS ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES
(INCLUDING PROCEDURES FOR LARGE, COMPLEX COMMERCIAL DISPUTES) R. 20 (2012) [hereinafter WILLS
AND TRUSTS ARBITRATION RULES]. The rules with explicit provisions for “Large, Complex Disputes” contain
even more discretion on the issue of pre-hearing evidentiary exchanges. See, e.g., sources cited supra.
206
See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 21.
207
See id.
208
Id. at O-4 (explaining the “Interim Award” rule) (“If after consideration the emergency arbitrator is
satisfied that the party seeking the emergency relief has shown that immediate and irreparable loss or damage
202
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or another might discard or otherwise spoil evidence, the arbitrator would
be able to provide for an interim measure to keep the parties from
destroying valuable evidence.209
At the hearing, the arbitrator can require witnesses to testify under oath
as a matter of course or if they are concerned about the veracity of witness
testimony.210 In addition to their statutory powers to subpoena witnesses
and documents, arbitrators also hold this power by virtue of the arbitral
rules.211 Arbitrators, then, have the power to subpoena witnesses who have
been difficult to find or otherwise uncooperative in the prehearing
process.212 At the hearing, the arbitrator has wide latitude on evidentiary
matters and can admit or exclude evidence under a broad, discretionary
standard.213 Under this type of rule, an arbitrator has the discretion to refuse
will result in the absence of emergency relief, and that such party is entitled to such relief, the emergency
arbitrator may enter an interim award granting the relief and stating the reasons therefore.”); see also AM.
ARBITRATION ASS’N, EMP’T ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES R. 32 (2009) [hereinafter
EMP’T ARBITRATION RULES]; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL FINANCE RULES (INCLUDING SAMPLE
CLAUSES AND MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION RULES) R. 32 (2009) [hereinafter COMMERCIAL FINANCE
RULES]; HEALTHCARE ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at O-4; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, PROF’L
ACCOUNTING AND RELATED SERVS. DISPUTE RESOLUTION RULES R. 34 (2009) [hereinafter PROF’L
ACCOUNTING DISPUTE RULES]; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, REAL ESTATE INDUS. ARBITRATION RULES
(INCLUDING A MEDIATION ALTERNATIVE) R. 36 (2009) [hereinafter REAL ESTATE ARBITRATION RULES];
WILLS AND TRUSTS ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 34, O-4.
209
See, e.g., COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at O-4.
210
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 25 (detailing the rule on “Oaths”) (“The
arbitrator may require witnesses to testify under oath administered by any duly qualified person and, if it is
required by law or requested by any party, shall do so.”); see also COMMERCIAL FINANCE RULES, supra note
208, at R. 25; CONSTRUCTION ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 27; EMP’T ARBITRATION RULES,
supra note 208, at R. 25; HEALTHCARE ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 24; INS. ARBITRATION
RULES, supra note 205, at R. 20; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, LABOR ARBITRATION RULES R. 23 (2013); PROF’L
ACCOUNTING DISPUTE RULES, supra note 208, at R. 27; REAL ESTATE ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 208, at
R. 29; WILLS AND TRUSTS ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 24; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, WIRELESS
INDUS. ARBITRATION RULES R. 26 (2009).
211
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 31(d) (detailing the rule on “Evidence”) (“An
arbitrator or other person authorized by law to subpoena witnesses or documents may do so upon the request of
any party or independently.”); see also CONSTRUCTION ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 33(d);
HEALTHCARE ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 30(d); AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, HOME CONSTR.
ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES ARB-32(d) (2007) [hereinafter HOME CONSTR.
ARBITRATION RULES]; INS. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 25(d); LABOR ARBITRATION RULES,
supra note 210, at R. 27; PROF’L ACCOUNTING DISPUTE RULES, supra note 208, at R. 31; REAL ESTATE
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 208, at R. 33; WILLS AND TRUSTS ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R.
31(d); WIRELESS INDUS. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 210, at R. 30.
212
See, e.g., COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 31(d).
213
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 31(b) (explaining further the rule on
“Evidence”) (“The arbitrator shall determine the admissibility, relevance, and materiality of the evidence offered
and may exclude evidence deemed by the arbitrator to be cumulative or irrelevant.”); see also COMMERCIAL
FINANCE RULES, supra note 208, at R. 29; CONSTRUCTION ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 33(b);
HEALTHCARE ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 30(b); HOME CONSTR. ARBITRATION RULES, supra
note 211, at ARB-32(b); INS. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 25(b); LABOR ARBITRATION RULES,
supra note 210, at R. 27; PROF’L ACCOUNTING DISPUTE RULES, supra note 208, at R. 31; REAL ESTATE

2014]

Lying, Stealing, and Cheating

477

to admit evidence that appears to be false or can simply consider the value
of the evidence “for what it’s worth” at the time the arbitrators render an
award.214 With respect to their award, arbitrators have great flexibility to
render an award that is “just and equitable,” provided the award falls within
the grant of the arbitrators’ powers.215 These awards can, therefore, reflect
misconduct occurring within the tribunal and right the wrong at the first
level.216 Finally, the arbitrator has great discretion to interpret the rules “as
they relate to the arbitrator’s powers and duties,”217 which gives added
flexibility to deal with situations, like participant misconduct, not directly
addressed in the rules.
The AAA rules, however, suffer from a lack of specificity on the issue
of ethics enforcement, and the rules would be greatly improved if they gave
arbitrators the specific ability to remedy ethical wrongs in the forum. Once
rules are in place, the AAA would also have to educate its arbitrators on
those new rules and the continuing obligation on arbitrators to ensure that
the process is fair and comports with minimum due process
requirements. Given the AAA’s commitment to due process (though the
use of Due Process Protocols), this type of change would fit well within the
AAA’s mission. Such a simple change would greatly cue arbitrators to
their role in the process.
3. JAMS Rules
JAMS is a provider organization specializing in providing former
judiciary employees as mediators and arbitrators.218 Like the AAA, JAMS
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 208, at R. 33; WILLS AND TRUSTS ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R.
31(b); WIRELESS INDUS. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 210, at R. 30.
214
See, e.g., COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 30(b).
215
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 43(a) (detailing the rule for “Scope of
Award”); see also COMMERCIAL FINANCE RULES, supra note 208, at R. 41; CONSTRUCTION ARBITRATION
RULES, supra note 205, at R. 45; EMP’T ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 208, at R. 39; HEALTHCARE
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 42; HOME CONSTR. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 211, at ARB43; INS. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 35; PROF’L ACCOUNTING DISPUTE RULES, supra note 208,
at R. 43; REAL ESTATE ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 208, at R. 45; WILLS AND TRUSTS ARBITRATION
RULES, supra note 205, at R. 43; WIRELESS INDUS. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 210, at R. 41.
216
See, e.g., COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 43.
217
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 53 (detailing the “Interpretation and
Application of Rules”); see also COMMERCIAL FINANCE RULES, supra note 208, at R. 16; CONSTRUCTION
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 8; EMP’T ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 208, at R. 48;
HEALTHCARE ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 53; HOME CONSTR. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note
211, at ARB-49; INS. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 43; LABOR ARBITRATION RULES, supra note
210, at R. 47; PROF’L ACCOUNTING DISPUTE RULES, supra note 208, at R. 52; REAL ESTATE ARBITRATION
RULES, supra note 208, at R. 55; WILLS AND TRUSTS ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 53; WIRELESS
INDUS. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 210, at R. 52.
218
About
JAMS,
JUDICIAL
ARBITRATION
AND
MEDIATION
SERVS.,
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provides neutrals and administrative support for a wide variety of cases, but
JAMS has far fewer sets of rules than the AAA, with a large number of
disputes falling under the “JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and
Procedures.”219 This set of rules provides the basic outline of an arbitration
administered by JAMS, which contains ample flexibility for arbitrators to
address ethical issues and other types of participant wrongdoing.220 Unlike
the AAA rules, the JAMS rules have already taken steps to help eradicate
unethical conduct in the forum.
Under JAMS rules, prior to the arbitration hearing, the parties have a
duty to engage in a “good faith” exchange of documentary evidence,
including electronically stored information (ESI).221 Information not
exchanged prior to the hearing can be excluded at the hearing as a
consequence for nondisclosure.222 This “good faith” requires participants to
act in an ethical manner and not hide documentary evidence, and the
arbitrator can certainly remind the parties of their obligation and try to
determine whether the parties meet their obligations.223 In addition to the
parties’ obligations, the arbitrator has discretion to rule on discovery
disputes224 and to issue subpoenas for witnesses and documents.225

http://www.jamsadr.com/aboutus/xpqGC.aspx?xpST=AboutUs(last visited Mar. 22, 2014). JAMS
neutrals are not exclusively former judges, but the organization prides itself in having a large roster with
judicial experience. Id. The organization’s website boasts: “Nearly 300 full-time neutrals, including
retired judges and attorneys with proven track records.” Id.
219
See generally JUDICIAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION SERVS., JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION
RULES AND PROCEDURES (2010) [hereinafter JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES], available at
http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-comprehensive-arbitration/ (follow “English” hyperlink). JAMS does have
additional rules for class action, construction, employment, expedited (e.g., streamlined), and international
arbitrations. See ADR Clauses, Rules, and Procedures, JUDICIAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION SERVS.,
http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-clauses/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
220
See sources cited supra note 219.
221
JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 219, at R. 17(a); see also JUDICIAL ARBITRATION AND
MEDIATIONS SERVS., JAMS STREAMLINED ARBITRATION RULES AND PROCEDURES R. 13(a) (2009)
[hereinafter JAMS STREAMLINED ARBITRATION RULES]; JUDICIAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION SERVS.,
JAMS ENG’G AND CONSTR. ARBITRATION RULES AND PROCEDURES R. 17(a) (2009) [hereinafter JAMS ENG’G
AND CONSTR. ARBITRATION RULES]; JUDICIAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION SERVS., EMP’T ARBITRATION
RULES AND PROCEDURES R. 17(a) (2009) [hereinafter JAMS EMP’T ARBITRATION RULES].
222
JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 219, at R. 17(c); see also JAMS STREAMLINED
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 221, at R. 13(b); JAMS ENG’G AND CONSTR. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note
221, at R. 17(c); JAMS EMP’T ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 221, at R. 17(c).
223
See, e.g., JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 219, at R. 17.
224
Id. at R. 17(d); see also JAMS STREAMLINED ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 221, at R. 13(c); JAMS
ENG’G AND CONSTR. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 221, at R. 17(d); JAMS EMP’T ARBITRATION RULES,
supra note 221, at R. 17(d).
225
JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 219, at R. 21 (securing witnesses and documents for the
arbitration hearing); see also JAMS STREAMLINED ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 221, at R. 16; JAMS ENG’G
AND CONSTR. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 221, at R. 17(d); JAMS EMP’T ARBITRATION RULES, supra note
221, at R. 21.
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Arbitrators who become aware of unethical conduct can deal with these
types of issues on motion and try to resolve them even prior to the hearing.
As with the AAA rules, the arbitrators are afforded a great deal of
discretion. Unlike the AAA rules, those discretionary rules are largely
contained in the same provision.226 JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration
Rules and Procedures, Rule 22 gives the arbitrators a wide scope of power,
including: (1) discretion to “vary the procedures if it is deemed reasonable
and appropriate,” (2) discretion to require that witnesses testify under oath,
(3) flexibility to consult (but not be bound by) court evidentiary codes and
procedures, and (4) flexibility to re-open a hearing prior to issuing an award
for “good cause shown.”227 These rules give considerable flexibility and
tools for an arbitrator to deal with ethical issues arising during the hearing
process.228 Arbitrators are free to disregard tainted evidence or issue orders
to rectify unethical conduct.229 Arbitrators also have the ability under these
rules to issue “whatever interim measures are deemed necessary” to
preserve evidence or otherwise maintain a fair forum.230
The JAMS rules recognize that attorneys and participants may not
always act ethically and in good faith. To this end, the JAMS rules allow
arbitrators to issue sanctions against parties who do not comply with the
rules.231 Rule 29 of the JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and
Procedures gives the arbitrator the following powers:
The Arbitrator may order appropriate sanctions for failure of a Party to
comply with its obligations under any of these Rules. These sanctions
may include, but are not limited to, assessment of Arbitration fees and
Arbitrator compensation and expenses; assessment of any other costs
occasioned by the actionable conduct, including reasonable attorneys’
fees; exclusion of certain evidence; drawing adverse inferences; or, in
extreme cases, determining an issue or issues submitted to Arbitration

226

See, e.g., JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 219, at R. 22.
Id. at R. 22 (detailing how the arbitration hearing will proceed); see also JAMS STREAMLINED
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 221, at R. 17; JAMS ENG’G AND CONSTR. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note
221, at R. 22; JAMS EMP’T ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 221, at R. 22.
228
See sources cited supra note 227.
229
See sources cited supra note 227.
230
JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 219, at R. 24 (detailing the “Awards” rule); see also JAMS
STREAMLINED ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 221, at R. 19; JAMS ENG’G AND CONSTR. ARBITRATION
RULES, supra note 221, at R. 24; JAMS EMP’T ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 221, at R. 24.
231
JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 219, at R. 29 (detailing the “Sanctions” rule); see also JAMS
STREAMLINED ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 221, at R. 24; JAMS ENG’G AND CONSTR. ARBITRATION
RULES, supra note 221, at R. 29; JAMS EMP’T ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 221, at R. 29.
227
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232

This sanctions rule allows arbitrators to right ethical wrongs in the first
instance. While the previous rules give arbitrators the ability to require
production of documents, support maintaining documents, and encouraging
truthful testimony through testimony under oath,233 the rule regarding
sanctions goes further by giving arbitrators the authority to assess monetary
damages or apply burden-shifting presumptions to right ethical wrongs.234
In this respect, JAMS is ahead of many of its institutional counterparts
in terms of regulating participant conduct. These JAMS rules serve as a
good starting point for other organizations to consider adding ethical
conduct rules. In addition, JAMS would be well served to train their
arbitrators on issues of ethical conduct, helping them understand that
arbitrators are the first and last true line of defense for a fair
forum. Principles of fundamental fairness and due process require that
JAMS and other provider organizations keep arbitrators informed of their
duties as “ethics enforcer” and ultimate gatekeeper of the process.
4. International Chamber of Commerce
Although this paper concerns domestic arbitration, as opposed to
international arbitration, it is worth noting some of the highlights of at least
one major international arbitral provider. As noted above,235 parties can
choose to be bound by rules of a provider organization, even if they do not
ultimately use that provider organization to administer the proceeding. In
other words, parties to a contract could pick an international set of
arbitration procedures, but agree to have the “seat” of the arbitration in the
United States. This option might be particularly attractive to international
parties or parties who are familiar with a specific set of international
rules.236 For illustrative purposes, this section considers the rules of the
International Chamber of Commerce, a large organization devoted to

232
233
234
235
236

JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 219, at R. 29.
See supra notes 221–30 and accompanying text.
See JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 219, at R. 29.
See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
See source cited supra note 195.
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worldwide business policy issues.237 The ICC also provides dispute
resolution services through the ICC International Court of Arbitration.238
Under the ICC rules, arbitrators have great flexibility to design
procedures to make arbitration a cost and time-effective manner of dispute
resolution for the parties.239 The arbitrators’ primary responsibility is to
determine the facts of the case, and they have a number of tools to help
them do so.240 As is common in international arbitrations, the arbitrators
may consider long affidavits in lieu of directly examining testimony, or
they may require the attendance of witnesses at hearings.241 Arbitrators
concerned about perjured testimony or falsified documents would have the
power to independently request additional evidence on those points in order
to quell their concerns.242 The ICC rules also have a provision allowing
arbitrators to issue interim awards, which, broadly read, could include an
award requiring parties to maintain evidence to ensure its preservation.243
Arbitrators working under these rules can also tax arbitration costs to a
party who engaged in certain types of misconduct—especially if the
misconduct prolongs the dispute resolution process.244 As with the other
sets of rules, the arbitrator has great flexibility to interpret all of the rules—
and gaps in the rules—to promote fair dispute resolution.245

237
See generally INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (ICC) RULES OF ARBITRATION (Int’l Chamber of
Commerce 2010) [hereinafter ICC ARBITRATION RULES], available at http://www.iccwbo.org/Products-andServices/Arbitration-and-ADR/Arbitration/Rules-of-arbitration/ICC-Rules-of-Arbitration/.
238
Functions of the ICC International Court of Arbitration, INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
http://www.iccwbo.org/About-ICC/Organization/Dispute-Resolution-Services/ICC-International-Court-ofArbitration/Functions-of-the-ICC-International-Court-of-Arbitration/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
239
ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 237, at art. 22(1) (“The arbitral tribunal and the parties shall make
every effort to conduct the arbitration in an expeditious and cost-effective manner, having regard to the
complexity and value of the dispute.”); id. at art. 24(2) (“During or following such conference, the arbitral
tribunal shall establish the procedural timetable that it intends to follow for the conduct of the arbitration. The
procedural timetable and any modifications thereto shall be communicated to the Court and the parties.”).
240
See id. at art. 25, 26.
241
Id. (requiring arbitrators to act in an expeditious manner; giving the arbitrators flexibility over the
manner in which they determine facts; giving the arbitrators the power to request additional information or expert
opinions; and allowing arbitrators to hold hearings as necessary).
242
See id. at art. 25.
243
See id. at art. 28.
244
Id. at art. 37 (“In making decisions as to costs, the arbitral tribunal may take into account such
circumstances as it considers relevant, including the extent to which each party has conducted the arbitration in
an expeditious and cost-effective manner.”).
245
Id. at art. 19 (“The proceedings before the arbitral tribunal shall be governed by the Rules and, where the
Rules are silent, by any rules which the parties or, failing them, the arbitral tribunal may settle on, whether or not
reference is thereby made to the rules of procedure of a national law to be applied to the arbitration.”); id. at art.
41 (“In all matters not expressly provided for in the Rules, the Court and the arbitral tribunal shall act in the spirit
of the Rules and shall make every effort to make sure that the award is enforceable at law.”).
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Thus, arbitrators practicing under a set of rules promulgated by a
respected provider organization already have a number of tools to deal with
unethical issues. The rules often provide a direct answer—or at least
indirect support—to deal with lying witnesses, absent witnesses, tampered
documents, hidden documents, and other types of misconduct within the
arbitral forum.246 These types of rules give the arbitrators little excuse for
not addressing unethical behavior in the first instance prior to or at the
hearing, or whenever the issue arises by the parties or sua sponte. The
rules, however, could be strengthened by specifically adding provisions
regarding participant misconduct and the ability of arbitrators to sanction
wrongdoers for violating the rules.
5. Assessing Credibility Through Live Witness Testimony
When arbitrators conduct hearings, they will undoubtedly assess the
credibility of witnesses and observe the demeanor of the parties and
counselors. Although this particular “tool” for arbitrators may seem
obvious, it is a valuable and readily available way for arbitrators to curb
lying in arbitration, and may help resolve any lingering questions about the
genuineness of documents.247
The tradition in common law countries, such as the United States, is for
arbitrators to hold live hearings with witnesses who testify on both direct
and cross-examination.248 In contrast, witness testimony plays a less
important role in civil law systems and written statements often replace the
witness’ direct testimony.249 Arbitration, with roots in both systems,
provides parties the option to choose either type of system.250 Arbitrators
have great flexibility to hear witness testimony—under direct examination,

246

See supra Part V.B.2–4.
See Ariana R. Levinson, Lawyering Skills, Principles and Methods Offer Insight as to Best Practices for
Arbitration, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 46–47 (2008).
248
See, e.g., John A. Wolf & Kelly M. Preteroti, Written Witness Statements—A Practical Bridge of
the Cultural Divide, DISP. RESOL. J., May–July 2007, at 82, 84 (“The right of confrontation has long
been a bedrock principle in common law litigation. As a result, written witness statements are generally
considered inadmissible hearsay.”).
249
Id. at 85 (“Written witness statements replace direct oral testimony of the parties’ witnesses.”);
see also Barbara Black, Is Securities Arbitration Fair to Investors?, 25 PACE L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2004)
(“[M]ost disputes between customers and brokers involve issues of credibility, and the arbitrator has no
opportunity to assess the credibility of the parties. Under the current system, the arbitrator can call a
hearing to resolve these issues, but arbitrators understandably may be reluctant to do so, since it defeats
the purpose of a simplified arbitration.”).
250
See Kimberly R. Wagner, The Perfect Circle: Arbitration’s Favors Become Its Flaws in an Era of
Nationalization and Regulation, 12 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. J. 159, 164 (2012).
247
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cross-examination, or both—or to conduct “paper proceedings,” in which
no live testimony takes place at all.251 While paper proceedings and limited
witness testimony promotes the efficiency of the arbitration proceeding,
limited contact with witnesses (fact and expert) can deprive the arbitral
tribunal of valuable contextual information.252
Live witness testimony gives the arbitrator a first-hand chance to assess
the veracity of the witness. Like trial judges, administrative judges, and
other fact finders, arbitrators are in the best position to weigh conflicting
evidence and determine the truth amidst varying versions of stories or
outright conflicting testimony.253 If an arbitrator has questions about who
to believe, the arbitrator can observe the demeanor of witnesses, including
how they answer questions, the tone of their voice, the speed of their
speech, and their body language, in order to determine who to believe.254
Of course, none of these methods of assessing credibility and determining
the truth are foolproof,255 but the arbitrators will likely be the only people in
the room who will be unbiased and in a position to make that assessment.256

251

See, e.g., JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 219, at R. 22.
Claude R. Thomson & Annie M.K. Finn, Managing an International Arbitration, DISP. RESOL.
J., May–July 2005, at 74, 80 (“[Witness statements] do not substitute for a proper examination-in-chief.
Second, having a direct examination affords the arbitrator an opportunity to assess the credibility of the
witness while presenting evidence in his or her own words, without leading by counsel.”); Wolf &
Preteroti, supra note 248, at 87 (“For example, if there is a concern that the arbitrators will not have a
sufficient opportunity to assess the credibility of a particular witness, the arbitrator could order a brief
direct examination.”).
253
See, e.g., Jones v. E.P.A., No. 2012-3167, 2013 WL 1316940, at *3 n.4 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 3, 2013)
(“However, it is not the function of this court to ‘re-weigh conflicting evidence,’ so this argument
[regarding credibility] does not provide a basis for upsetting the arbitrator’s factual findings.”); DuBois
v. Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc., No. 11 CV 4904(NGG)(LB), 2012 WL 4060739, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.
17, 2012) (“It is the role of the arbitrators to make factual findings, weigh evidence, and assess the
credibility of witnesses.”) (citation omitted); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 701 v. CBF Trucking, Inc.,
No. Civ. 09-5525, 2010 WL 2400400, at *3 (D.N.J. June 10, 2010) (“However, it is the arbitrator’s role
to assess a witness’s credibility and the Court may not overturn an award simply because it may have
reached a different determination.”); Fairchild Corp. v. Alcoa, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 2d 280, 288 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (“The Arbitrator had opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses and the reliability of the
evidence, taking into account the record as a whole.”).
254
See Ronald J. Allen, Rationality and the Taming of Complexity, 62 ALA. L. REV. 1047, 1055 (2011).
255
Consider the following passage cited in Allen, supra note 254:
252

Is the witness sweating or twitching, and if so is it through innocent nerves, the pressure of
prevarication, a medical problem, or simply a distasteful habit picked up during a regrettable
childhood? Does body language suggest truthfulness or evasion; is slouching evidence of
lying or comfort in telling a straightforward story? Does the witness look the examiner
straight in the eye, and if so is it evidence of commendable character or the confidence of an
accomplished snake oil salesman? Does the voice inflection suggest the rectitude of the
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Arbitration offers a relatively unique opportunity for decision-makers to
step in and question witnesses directly.257 Although American trial practice
generally does not involve judges directly questioning the witness, domestic
arbitrators will regularly ask witnesses questions in order to flesh out facts,
clarify confusing points, and otherwise aid the arbitrators in making their
decisions.258 Some arbitration procedures, such as those conducted by the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) specifically alert
participants that the “arbitrators may also question these witnesses.”259
Arbitrators, then, with lingering questions about conflicting testimony or
the reliability of evidence cannot only observe witnesses’ testimony but
also seek clarification on these issues by questioning witnesses
themselves.260
Relying on arbitrators to determine the veracity of witnesses is not
without its drawbacks, however. Empirical research demonstrates that triallevel judges are not particularly accurate at determining the truthfulness of
witnesses.261 If trial judges are not successful at distinguishing between
truth tellers and liars, then arbitrators may not be any better. Perhaps,
though, vigilance to demeanor, voice tone, hesitations, body language, and
contradictions could make all fact-finders more accurate in this regard.
If arbitrators are vigilant during the hearing, then they can best assess
the veracity of the witnesses and try to determine who is telling the
truth. Perhaps if arbitrators remain constantly aware and critical of the
truthfulness of witnesses, they can make more accurate determinations
regarding veracity. If arbitrators can accurately distinguish between truth
tellers and liars, the arbitral forum will be fairer.

righteous or is it strained, and does a strained voice indicate fabrication or concern over the
outcome of the case?
Id. (citation omitted); see also Danielle E. Chojnacki et al., An Empirical Basis for the Admission of
Expert Testimony on False Confessions, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 31 (2008) (citing studies showing that even
individuals trained in deception techniques have a difficult time in determining whether a person is lying
based on the individual’s body language).
256
See Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 976.
257
J.S. “Chris” Christie, Jr., Preparing For and Prevailing at an Arbitration Hearing, 32 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 265, 277 (2008) (“The arbitrator may ask questions of witnesses and is generally given
discretion to conduct the arbitration hearing to expedite resolution.”); Levinson, supra note 247, at 27
(“Sometimes the arbitrator will intervene with questions for the witnesses.”).
258
See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
259
Hearings, FINRA ARBITRATION & MEDIATION, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation
/Arbitration/Process/Hearings/index.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
260
See, e.g., id.
261
See sources cited supra note 255.
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6. Adverse Inference and Other Presumptions
In the American legal system, if a party withholds documents in bad
faith, the “victim” party can move for a jury instruction that the document
would have contained information adverse to the nonproducing party.262
The court determines whether the burden is satisfied and considers whether
a party acted in bad faith.263 Awarding one party an adverse inference is a
common remedy when a court determines that a party has spoliated
evidence.264
Arbitrators, too, can make adverse inferences in the event that a party
acts in bad faith and spoliates evidence. Because arbitrations do not involve
juries, arbitrators who find that an adverse inference is warranted would
simply apply the inference themselves when determining the award.265 In
this way, the adverse inference would operate in the same manner as if a
judge presiding over a bench trial were to find an adverse inference
warranted in a trial proceeding.266 The arbitrator would simply determine if
the adverse inference should apply, and if so, apply the inference.267
Some arbitral provider rules, such as JAMS, specifically allow
arbitrators to award an adverse inference as a sanction for unethical
conduct. As noted above,268 JAMS rules offer arbitrators a wide variety of
sanctions, including the possibility of “drawing adverse inferences” in the
appropriate cases.269 If other provider organizations incorporated this type
of rule, no question would exist with respect to the availability of the

262

See Reinsdorf v. Sketchers U.S.A., Inc., No. CV 10-7181 DDP (SSx), 2013 WL 3878685, at *19–21
(C.D. Cal. July 19, 2013) (describing the standard for spoliation); Kostic v. A&M Univ. at Commerce, No. 3:10cv-2265-M, 2013 WL 3356263, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 3, 2013) (“Under the spoliation doctrine, a jury may draw
an adverse inference ‘that a party who intentionally destroys important evidence in bad faith did so because the
contents of those documents were unfavorable to that party.’”); Research Found. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Nektar
Therapeutics, No. 1:09-cv-1292 (GLS/CFH), 2013 WL 2145652, at *10 (N.D.N.Y May 15, 2013) (finding no
adverse jury instruction warranted under the circumstances); Drakeford v. Univ. of Chicago Hosps., No. 1-111366, 2013 WL 3296586, at *11 (Ill. Ct. App. June 28, 2013) (“In this case, the jury was allowed to draw adverse
inferences from the fact that certain hospital documents and alleged handwritten notes were missing from the
infant’s medical chart.”).
263
See Peeler v. KVH Indus., Inc., No. 8:12-cv-1584-T-33TGW, 2013 WL 3871420, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July
25, 2013) (discussing the test for spoliation and the resulting adverse inference if the test is met); Gen. Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. N.Y. Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 961 N.Y.S.2d 142, 144–46 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (finding
adverse inference warranted under the facts of the case).
264
See Cecilia Hallinan, Comment, Balancing the Scales After Evidence Is Spoiled: Does Pennsylvania’s
Approach Sufficiently Protect the Injured Party, 44 VILL. L. REV. 947, 950 (1999).
265
See Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 954.
266
See id.
267
See id.
268
See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
269
JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 219, at R. 29.
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adverse inference sanction. Other provider organizations and the common
law give arbitrators such flexibility (as noted above) to award sanctions,
and this authority is well within an arbitrator’s inherent powers to manage
proceedings.270 As discussed in more detail below, courts will largely
affirm an adverse inference drawn by an arbitrator when a party withholds
documents in bad faith.271
Of course, using adverse inference remedies and other types of
evidentiary presumptions are limited measures to deal with unethical
conduct in the forum. This type of sanction, traditionally, has only been
utilized in the area of document destruction or willful, bad faith
nonproduction.272 An adverse inference would not address other types of
wrongful conduct, such as lying and falsifying documents, and would
provide little help in this situation.273 But if arbitrators begin to use this
type of tool, it would have the effect of leveling the playing field and
ensuring that the parties receive a fair forum.
7. Awarding Monetary Sanctions
Another potential sanction for parties who act unethically and otherwise
in bad faith could be the imposition of monetary sanctions on the wrongful
party or law firm involved. This type of sanction is also available in the
American legal system.274 For instance, if attorneys sign a document in bad
faith or commit discovery abuses, the law firm or the client may be liable
for sanctions, such as attorneys’ fees to remedy the wrongdoing.275
Arbitrators are also free to sanction parties for unethical conduct within the
forum.276
Much like the ability to apply adverse inferences, some arbitration
codes already explicitly allow the use of monetary sanctions in the event of

270
See, e.g., Seagate Tech., L.L.C. v. W. Digital Corp., 834 N.W.2d 555, 563 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013);
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 58.
271
See infra Part VI.
272
See Wm. Grayson Lambert, Keeping the Inference in the Adverse Inference Instruction: Ensuring the
Instruction is an Effective Sanction in Electronic Discovery Cases, 64 S.C. L. REV. 681, 685–687 (2013).
273
Cf. T. Patrick Gumkowski, Note, Protecting the Integrity of the Rhode Island Judicial System and
Assuring an Adequate Remedy for Victims of Spoliation: Why an Independent Cause of Action for the Spoliation
of Evidence Is the Solution, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 795, 814–816 (2005); Maria A. Losavio, Synthesis
of Louisiana Law on Spoliation of Evidence - Compared to the Rest of the Country, Did We Handle It
Correctly?, 58 LA. L. REV. 837, 862 (1998).
274
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c) (allowing a court to sanction “any attorney, law firm, or party that violated
the rule or is responsible for the violation” of the rule requiring the filing of pleadings in good faith); FED. R. CIV.
P. 37(b) (providing for the possibility of sanctioning a party for disobeying discovery orders).
275
See sources cited supra note 274.
276
See, e.g., JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 219, at R. 29.
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party or attorney misconduct. The JAMS sanction provisions specifically
allow for such financial penalties in appropriate situations: “These sanctions
may include, but are not limited to, assessment of Arbitration fees and
Arbitrator compensation and expenses; assessment of any other costs
occasioned by the actionable conduct, including reasonable attorneys’
fees.”277 The International Bar Association recently released the IBA Rules
on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration as a guideline for a
single set of rules for those from both common law and civil law
countries.278 With respect to discovery issues, the rules require the parties
to act in “good faith,” and the “Arbitral Tribunal may, in addition to any
other measures available under these Rules, take such failure into account in
its assignment of the costs of arbitration, including costs arising out of or in
connection with the taking of evidence.”279 Other sets of rules give
flexibility to the arbitrator that would likely give them plenty of authority to
address discovery issues by issuing sanctions.280 If more provider
organizations gave explicit flexibility to arbitrators to allow for the award of
monetary sanctions, then this would be another tool that all arbitrators could
use in order to correct misconduct and ensure a fair forum.
Unlike the remedy of making an adverse inference, the remedy of
sanctions could be used for any type of unethical conduct. Sanctions could
be appropriate to punish a party giving perjured testimony by awarding a
disproportionate amount of costs onto the guilty party. Sanctions for
unethical discovery wrongs could include attorneys’ fees for discovery
work (such as depositions or fees for preparing discovery motions) or an
assessment of costs. The arbitrator has considerable flexibility to right a
wide variety of wrongs with financial consequences.281 This type of tool
helps ensure that the forum is fair by compensating the wronged party for
having to defend against unethical tactics.

277

Id.
See generally INT’L BAR ASS’N, IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INT’L ARBITRATION
(2010) [hereinafter IBA RULES], available at http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=683
36C49-4106-46BF-A1C6-A8F0880444DC.
279
Id. at art. 9, cmt. 7. In comment 6, the IBA Rules also note the possibility that the arbitrator could
employ an adverse inference or other presumption for wrongful non-disclosure of documentary evidence. Id. at
art. 9, cmt. 6.
280
See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 58.
281
See id.; JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 219, at R. 29.
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8. Sanctioning a Party by Dismissing a Claim or Defense
For very serious wrongs, an arbitrator could impose the ultimate
penalty—outright dismissal of a claim or defense. This type of remedy for
a wrong is rarely used in the American legal system, but it is an option in
extreme cases.282 A court may sanction a party by dismissing a claim or
defense if that party engages in serious misconduct, such as fabricated
testimony (lay or expert) or reports, or other evidence.283 If perjury is
serious enough, a court could impose this type of sanction if the court found
that the remedy was appropriate under the circumstances.284
Arbitrators, too, could dismiss claims or defenses as a remedy for
wanton misconduct in the forum. Again, the JAMS rules explicitly give the
arbitrator this power, if the arbitrator chooses to exercise it.285 The
flexibility in other sets of rules would probably also allow an arbitrator to
dismiss a claim or defense for an egregious violation of ethical rules.286
More explicit instruction from other provider organizations to give
arbitrators this power would help provide a fair forum. The ability to
sanction parties by dismissing claims and defenses would serve both as a
deterrent and as a remedial measure.
Although the ability to dismiss a claim or defense is within the realm of
what an arbitrator is permitted to do, arbitrators would likely be justifiably
hesitant to actually resort to this remedy. Unlike judges, arbitrators do not
issue “default” judgments.287 If one party—usually the respondent—fails to
appear, the claimant still must make a case and prove entitlement to the

See, e.g., Warren v. Estate of Wade, No. 12-11037, 2013 WL 3927796, at *1 (5th Cir. July 31, 2013) (“In
addition, we warn Warren that frivolous, repetitive, or otherwise abusive filings will invite the imposition of
sanctions, including dismissal, monetary sanctions, and/or restrictions on his ability to file pleadings in this court
and any court subject to this court's jurisdiction.”); Pietraroia v. Ne. Utils., 756 A.2d 845, 854 (Conn. 2000)
(“[T]he sanction of dismissal should be imposed only as a last resort, and where it would be the only reasonable
remedy available to vindicate the legitimate interests of” the other party and the court); Arzuman v. Saud, 843 So.
2d 950, 952 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that trial courts should reserve the dismissal sanction “for
instances where the defaulting party's misconduct is correspondingly egregious”).
283
See, e.g., Brown v. Oil States Skagit Smatco, L.L.C., 664 F.3d 71, 77–79 (5th Cir. 2011).
284
Id.
285
JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 219, at R. 29 (“The Arbitrator may order appropriate
sanctions for failure of a Party to comply with its obligations under any of these Rules. These sanctions
may include . . . , in extreme cases, determining an issue or issues submitted to Arbitration adversely to
the Party that has failed to comply.”).
286
See, e.g., FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE FOR CUSTOMER
DISPUTES R. 12212 (2012).
287
See Roger Haydock, Setting the Record Straight About Contractual Arbitration, W. VA. LAW., Nov.–
Dec. 2006, at 12, 12 (“‘Default’ arbitration awards do not exist under FORUM rules. If a respondent fails to
answer, the arbitrator is required to issue an award based upon a ‘timely review of the merits’ of that claim.”)
(citation omitted).
282
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relief sought.288 Dismissing a claim or defense as a sanction would be a
dramatic step for an arbitrator, and an arbitrator rightfully might refuse to
grant this type of remedy on the basis that an award arising out of such a
sanction might be subject to vacatur by the courts.289 Specifically, the
courts can vacate an award if an arbitrator refused to consider evidence,290
and issuing sanctions might be construed as a refusal to consider certain
evidence. The much safer ground for an arbitrator would be to consider the
evidence “for what it’s worth” and then find against the party who has
engaged in unethical behavior.291 The ability to use this remedy, however,
is a powerful tool for either deterrent effect or for remedial use. Having this
type of extreme tool in the toolbox would help make arbitration a fairer
forum able to effectively remedy wrongdoing.
9. Continuum of Possibilities
This section has demonstrated that arbitrators have a wide variety of
tools at their disposal to become the first hand “ethics enforcers” of their
own tribunals. These measures can be as unobtrusive as asking a witness
some clarifying questions to issuing monetary or other types of sanctions
upon determining that wrongful conduct has occurred.292 The arbitrators
who are on the ground and witnessing the conduct of the attorneys,
witnesses, experts, and clients first-hand are in the best position to deal with
ethical issues as they arise.293
Arbitrators must embrace their roles as ethics enforcers and understand
how they are likely the first and the last resort for dealing with unethical
conduct in the forum. Counselors, too, must become comfortable with
taking these types of issues to arbitrators in the first instance because courts
will not hear these types of motions while an arbitration is pending, and
waiting until after an award is handed down would likely result in a waiver

288
See id.; Irene C. Warshauer, Electronic Discovery in Arbitration: Privilege Issues and Spoliation of
Evidence, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2006–Jan. 2007, at 9, 14 (noting that there would be little likelihood for an
arbitrator to issue a default judgment against a party for failure to produce certain types of electronic data).
289
See Kashner Davidson Sec. Corp. v. Mscisz, 531 F.3d 68, 78–79 (1st Cir. 2008) (vacating arbitration
award based on arbitrator’s improper dismissal of a counterclaim as a sanction). But see AmeriCredit Fin. Servs.,
Inc. v. Oxford Mgmt. Servs., 627 F. Supp. 2d 85, 96 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that even if dismissal of
counterclaim was a sanction, it did not warrant vacating the arbitration award).
290
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (2012) (allowing vacatur of an award when the arbitrators “refus[ed] to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy”).
291
See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.
292
See supra Part V.B.5–8.
293
See supra notes 186–92 and accompanying text.
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of the issue.294 If the arbitrators do not take steps to remedy ethical wrongs,
those wrongs will likely go unpunished, creating an injustice for the victim
parties.295 If ethical issues on a system-wide basis are not remedied,
arbitration would become an unfair forum in which parties could resort to
any means in order to “win.”296 Arbitrators, then, must be the first and
likely the last resort for dealing with these types of wrongs unless and until
the law changes to give additional remedies to deal with participant wrongs,
such as changing the criminal laws and slightly loosening the standard for
vacatur of awards based on participant misconduct.297
10. Arbitrators Must Step out of Their “Comfort Zone”
Admittedly, acting as an “ethics enforcer” is not a comfortable spot for
anyone, much less an arbitrator. As noted above, arbitrators are chosen on
the open market, usually by the counsel for the parties. Many people would
like to be arbitrators, and the profession is a difficult one to break
into.298 For the most part, being chosen as an arbitrator is an honor. Being
chosen as an arbitrator is also a potentially lucrative prospect. Arbitrators
can charge upwards of $500 per hour or more, depending on the type of
case and the agreements of the parties.299 Arbitrators who perform well
have the potential of receiving repeat business from the parties or their
counsel.
Given this situation, arbitrators may be hesitant to be as vigilant as they
need to be in order to deal with misconduct in the forum. Arbitrators may
simply be blind to the fact that the parties who chose them would actually
commit unethical conduct. At a more cynical level, a worry exists that
arbitrators would intentionally overlook unethical conduct on the part of a

294
If a party does not raise an issue to the arbitrator in the first instance, that issue is waived if an
attorney later tries to use that theory as a basis upon which to vacate an award. See Goff v. Dakota,
Minn., & E. R.R. Corp., 276 F.3d 992, 998 (8th Cir. 2002); Porush v. Lemire, 6 F. Supp. 2d 178, 182
(E.D.N.Y. 1998).
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See Bennett, supra note 80, at 39.
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In my first paper on this issue, I referred to this potential for creating a landscape of unethical
behavior as the “wild west” of adjudication. See Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 925.
297
See supra notes 186–92 and accompanying text.
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See generally Sasha A. Carbone & Jeffrey T. Zaino, Increasing Diversity Among Arbitrators, N.Y. ST.
B.A. J., Jan. 2012.
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See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL FEE SCHEDULE (2010), available at
http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_004102; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSTRUCTION FEE
SCHEDULE (2010), available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_004254; AM. ARBITRATION
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PDF?doc=ADRSTAGE2011024; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES FEE
SCHEDULE (2013), available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTAGE 2011226.
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party or counsel who is a “repeat player” in arbitration (and likely to re-hire
the arbitrator), especially in a case against a “one shot player” who will
likely never again employ an arbitrator.
Increased arbitrator education could hopefully alleviate some of these
issues. A tightening of the arbitral provider rules would also give increased
guidance to the arbitrators about the tools available to them to right ethical
wrongs. Increased awareness of the arbitrators’ ethical duties will ensure
that arbitration is a forum comporting with due process and fundamental
fairness.
11. These Types of Remedies Do Not “Litigationize” the Arbitral Forum
Whenever any proposed changes to the arbitral forum involve the use of
judicial remedies and procedures, questions arise as to whether arbitration’s
inherent characteristics remain at the center of the process. This proposal
does include certain aspects of arbitrators using the same remedies as courts
and other adjudicators, but it still remains true to the fundamental goals of
arbitration—namely flexibility and finality.300
Flexibility is one of the greatest hallmarks of the arbitral process.301
Parties choose arbitration because the parties can design the process and
arbitrators have the power to award remedies not available to courts.302
Giving arbitrators a wide array of tools to deal with ethical violations
bolsters the flexibility afforded to arbitrators. Arbitrators face similar types
of problems as judges and other adjudicators,303 so it seems fitting that they
would be afforded similar tools to deal with ethical transgressions. Given
that the arbitral forum is essentially a forum of equity,304 the more tools
from which an arbitrator can choose, the easier the arbitrator can customize
any type of sanction or penalty to the specific circumstances of the ethical
violation.
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See discussion infra Part VI.
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See Boraks v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 517 N.W.2d 771, 772 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (“[T]he function of
arbitrators is analogous to that of a court and their duties require the exercise of judgment, like public judicial
officers . . . .”).
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The American judicial system, for the most part, is a forum of law; however, arbitrators have
considerably more flexibility to act from a theory of equity. Margaret M. Maggio & Richard A. Bales,
Contracting Around the FAA: The Enforceability of Private Agreements to Expand Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 151, 175–76 (2002) (“Courts, unfamiliar with the structure
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In addition, arbitration is a forum that promotes finality and efficient
dispute resolution. Having an arbitrator deal with ethical wrongs firsthand
would promote that all of the issues are resolved in one forum, and that
multiple, related proceedings are not being undertaken in different forums.
If arbitrators take a more active role in policing arbitral conduct, then all
issues will be considered at the same time. A losing party in arbitration
could then move to vacate the entire award, including the rulings on the
ethical issues.305 The reviewing court has limited grounds for vacatur,306
but the court could consider all of the issues at once, with the arbitrator
having already passed on the issue.
Of course, not every ethical violation can be addressed to an arbitrator
at the time it becomes known. Some ethical wrongs only come to light at a
later time after an arbitrator has already heard the case or while a case is
pending appeal. In those instances in which a party did not know or could
not have known about the ethical wrongs, the wronged party should have
the right to either request that the arbitration be reopened or to address the
ethical violations with a court.307 Otherwise, the party would have waived
the right to have the issue heard at all—either by an arbitrator or by the
courts.308 These types of waiver rules, then, also help promote the
arbitrator’s authority over the tribunal, as well as encourage the arbitrator to
have the first opportunity to pass on every issue within the arbitrator’s
powers.
VI. COURTS AFFORD ARBITRATORS GREAT DISCRETION
As noted above, the limited grounds for review insulate arbitrator
awards from attack and promote the finality of the arbitral process. Part of
this arbitrator discretion, then, extends to arbitrators’ decisions on ethical
issues, including the issuance of sanctions and other types of remedies for
dealing with misconduct in the arbitral forum.309
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See, e.g., Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 1344, 1359 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that a party
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Bros. Meat Packers, Inc., 518 F.2d 1113, 1121 n.19 (3d Cir. 1975) (noting that a “‘loser is not permitted for the
first time to raise an objection to the arbitration panel after the award has been made’”) (citation omitted); Stone
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For instance, in a recent case, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that
the inherent powers of an arbitrator include the ability to sanction a party
for misconduct. In Seagate Technology v. Western Digital Corp.,310 the
arbitrator heard an employment dispute for disclosure of trade secrets.311 At
the arbitration, the respondent argued that the trade secrets were actually
disclosed to the public, thus taking away their protected status.312 The
arbitrator found that the “evidence” of public disclosure was fabricated, and
the arbitrator sanctioned the offending party for creating fake evidence.313
The arbitrator found that this “misconduct” warranted “severe sanctions,”
including the preclusion of any evidence or defense “‘disputing the
validity’” of certain trade secrets.314 Ultimately, the arbitrator found trade
secret violations and ordered damages in the amount of $525 million,
prejudgment interest of nearly $100 million, and post-award interest of
more than $9 million.315 The trial court vacated the decision on the
alternative bases that the arbitrator exceeded his powers or misapplied
sanction law.316
The court of appeals reversed on two grounds. First, the court found
that the sanctioned party waived this argument.317 The sanctioned party
failed to challenge the arbitrator’s authority to issue sanctions at the
arbitration hearing and, in fact, requested that the arbitrator sanction the
other party.318 As to the arbitrator’s authority, the court noted that the
arbitration proceeded under AAA rules, which are silent on the issue of the
ability of an arbitrator to sanction a party for bad faith conduct.319 In this
instance, the court found that, given the broad powers of the arbitrator and
the failure of the contract to prohibit the award of sanctions, the arbitrator
had the inherent power to issue sanctions.320 Ultimately, the court upheld
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Seagate Tech. v. W. Digital Corp., 834 N.W.2d 555 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013).
Id. at 558. The arbitration agreement between the parties was broad, covering “any dispute or
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Seagate Tech., 834 N.W.2d at 563. The court also noted that, while the AAA rules do not
specifically speak to the ability to award sanctions, Rule 39 of the Employment Arbitration Rules and
Mediation Procedures allow an arbitrator to grant “any remedy or relief” available to a party at court,
including awards of attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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both the arbitrator’s ability to award sanctions as well as the amount of
sanctions awarded.321 The Seagate case demonstrates both the importance
of the waiver and the arbitrator’s inherent powers. This Minnesota court
recognizes the important policies behind arbitrator autonomy and authority
within the forum.322
Similarly, in AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc. v. Oxford
Management Services,323 the Eastern District of New York considered a
challenge to an arbitrator’s decision to dismiss counterclaims as a sanction
for destroying documents relevant to the claims at issue.324 The underlying
dispute involved a question of who had the right to pursue certain collection
matters.325 With regard to the sanctions, the arbitrator found that Oxford
“‘knowingly destroyed records necessary to resolve the disputes between
the parties.’”326
As a sanction, the arbitrator dismissed Oxford’s
327
counterclaims. The court found that, while the contract prohibited the
arbitrator from issuing punitive damages, the arbitrator did have the ability
to dismiss the counterclaims under the authority granted by contract and in
the ambiguity of the AAA rules.328 Again, decisions like this one preserve
the inherent authority that arbitrators have to ensure a fair forum and keep
parties from acting in an unethical manner in the process.329
These sample cases demonstrate the power afforded to arbitrators when
those arbitrators take affirmative steps to deal with ethical issues in the first
instance. Having the arbitrators address ethical violations as they occur will
allow the same decision-maker to rule on all issues relating to the process,
provided that the parties do not explicitly remove this ability from the
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2696394, at *11 (Haw. App. Ct. July 12, 2011) (“It is within the Arbitrator’s authority to impose discovery
sanctions.”). Interestingly, the Jones court involved a claim in which the arbitrator found an adverse inference
against the respondent party and then still ruled in favor of the respondent. 393 F. App’x at 871. The trial court
and Third Circuit confirmed the arbitral award based a review of the extensive record in the case. Id. In Davis v.
Reliance Electric Industrial Co., the arbitrator had grave concerns regarding the respondent-employer’s failure to
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arbitrators. Parties, as the masters of their agreement and ultimate designers
of the process, could attempt to take the ability to sanction parties out of the
hands of the arbitrator—but then it would be unclear who would retain that
power. As noted above, the courts have little ability to interfere with the
arbitral forum—during or after arbitration.330 If the arbitrator does not deal
with the ethical issue, it is very likely that no one will.331
To date, the cases seem to suggest that the arbitrators are dealing with
ethical issues regarding abuse of the forum, such as document or witness
tampering. These cases appear to center on parties who make these issues
known to the arbitrator either at a hearing or in a motion before or after the
hearing.332 Given the fact that many arbitrations involve pre-arbitration
discovery, counsel and parties will likely be apprised of discovery abuses at
an earlier time than the arbitrators. But arbitrators should not rely solely on
the parties to remedy unethical behavior in the forum. They need to be
watchful and determine whether the parties are acting in a way respectful of
each other and of the forum. Arbitrators should not be afraid to deal with
unethical conduct sua sponte because if arbitrators neglect these types of
issues, the ethical wrongs will likely go uncorrected, thus creating an unfair
forum for the parties—particularly the parties that are playing by the
rules.333
VII. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER – HOW ARBITRATORS CAN ALSO BENEFIT
FROM LEGISLATIVE CHANGE
As mentioned above, I have previously advocated for legislative change
in the area of arbitration ethics.334 This paper on arbitrators as ethics
enforcers does not contradict my previous research, but instead explores a
facet of participant ethics in arbitration and works in tandem with my
previous research. In fact, arbitrators, too, could benefit from a more
clearly defined law regarding arbitration ethics.
As things currently stand, the law is altogether murky as to whether
wrongful conduct perpetrated in the arbitral forum is even prohibited or
punishable by law.335 Perjury and tampering (both with witnesses and
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documents) questionably apply to the arbitral forum. 336 Dealing with
ethical and potential criminal conduct at the arbitral award confirmation or
vacatur stage also leaves a lot of conduct unaddressed because of high
burdens of proof and waiver issues.337 Accordingly, the arbitrators are often
the first and last line of defense to deal with wrongful conduct.338
If the criminal law, however, were to change, this would arguably give
arbitrators more authority to exert control over ethical issues in the process
and sanction wrongful conduct. Extending perjury and tampering laws to
the arbitral forum would give an arbitrator additional gravitas when issuing
an award for sanctions because the arbitrator could cite the criminal law as
a basis on which to base his or her award. A change in the criminal law
would likely have a de minimis effect on criminal prosecutions in any event.
Urging for a shift (or clarification) of the criminal law is meant to have a
deterrent effect on arbitration and give arbitrators the legal backing to
impose sanctions—it was not intended to turn arbitration into a police state.
These propositions can work hand in hand. Clarifying the law and
modifying some of the review standards will not take powers away from the
arbitrators. Instead, extending the criminal law would reinforce arbitrator
decisions and give arbitrators additional tools to manage their own forums.
A slight shift in the review provisions in the event of participant
misconduct—again, simply making the same standard available to all forms
of review—would treat arbitrator decisions on ethical issues in the same
way as every other arbitral decision. These tools preserve arbitrator
autonomy as the first (and likely last) authority on the conduct within the
arbitral forum. Utilizing these tools will ensure that arbitration is a fair
forum comporting with due process.
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